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Corporate Fundamental Responsibility:
What Do Technology Companies Owe the
World?
HAOCHEN SUN*
In this digital age, technology companies reign supreme.
However, the power gained by these companies far exceeds
the responsibilities they have assumed. The ongoing privacy
protection and fake news scandals swirling around Facebook clearly demonstrate this shocking asymmetry of power
and responsibility.
Legal reforms taking place in the United States in the
past twenty years or so have failed to correct this asymmetry.
Indeed, the U.S. Congress has enacted major statutes minimizing the legal liabilities of technology companies with respect to online infringing acts, privacy protection, and payment of taxes. While these statutes have promoted innovation, they have also had the unintended effect of breeding
irresponsibility among technology companies.
Against this backdrop, this Article offers a new lens
through which we can deal with the ethical crisis surrounding technology companies. It puts forward the concept of
corporate fundamental responsibility as the ethical and legal foundation for imposing three distinct responsibilities
upon technology companies: to reciprocate users’ contributions, play their role positively, and confront injustices cre-
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ated by technological development. The Article further considers how these responsibilities could be applied to improve
protection of private data and to encourage responsible exercise of intellectual property rights by technology companies.
The tripartite conception of corporate fundamental responsibility, this Article shows, is built upon the ethical theories of reciprocity, role responsibility, and social justice.
Therefore, corporate fundamental responsibility paves the
way for technology law to embrace ethics whole-heartedly,
creating new legal and ethical guidance for the benevolent
behavior of technology companies. In developing technologies, collecting data, and regulating speech, technology
company leaders must act responsibly for the future of humanity.
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INTRODUCTION
[I]t’s clear now that we didn’t do enough to prevent
[Facebook] from being used for harm as well. That
goes for fake news, foreign interference in elections,
and hate speech, as well as developers and data privacy. We didn’t take a broad enough view of our responsibility, and that was a big mistake.1
– Mark Zuckerberg
We live in an age of grotesque irony. Facebook has achieved
unparalleled success among technology companies, attracting 2.3
billion users in the fifteen years since its inception.2 However, it has
also abused the trust of those users.3 In the biggest privacy scandal
1

Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and
Transp., 115th Cong. 1 (2018) [hereinafter Facebook Hearing] (testimony of
Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Facebook).
2
Meira Gebel, In 15 Years Facebook Has Amassed 2.3 Billion Users — More Than Followers of Christianity, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2019, 1:29
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-has-2-billion-plus-users-after15-years-2019-2.
3
See ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED: WAKING UP TO THE FACEBOOK
CATASTROPHE 2 (2019) (“Technology platforms, including Facebook and
Google . . . have taken advantage of our trust, using sophisticated techniques to
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in social network history, Facebook secretively sold private user
data to Cambridge Analytica.4 It allowed its platform to become a
vehicle for the fake news that likely swayed the 2016 presidential
election in the United States.5 A judge even criticized Facebook as
“a tool for evil” in a judicial ruling.6
The irony of our age is that the responsibilities that technology
companies have assumed are far disproportionate to the power that
they have gained. When it comes to unchecked power, Facebook is
by no means unique. In the past ten years or so, technology companies have become the world’s richest and most politically powerful
corporate institutions.7 In collecting enormous amounts of data from
the public, technology companies have become owners of one of the
world’s most valuable resources.8 They regulate all kinds of speech
prey on the weakest aspects of human psychology, to gather and exploit private
data, and to craft business models that do not protect users from harm.”); Jordan Valinsky et al., Facebook’s Bottomless Pit of Scandals, CNN (Dec. 20,
2018), https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2018/12/business/facebooks-year-ofscandal/index.html.
4
See Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need
to Know as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html.
5
See Danielle Kurtzleben, Did Fake News on Facebook Help Elect Trump?
Here’s What We Know, NPR (Apr. 11, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/11/601323233/6-facts-we-know-about-fake-newsin-the-2016-election.
6
Facebook is a ‘Tool for Evil’, Says Judge as Mother Trolled Over
Fake Claims She Tried to Kill a Baby Is Found Dead, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 7, 2017,
9:36
AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/07/facebook-tool-evilsays-judge-mother-trolled-fake-claims-tried.
7
See JAMIE BARTLETT, THE PEOPLE VS TECH: HOW THE INTERNET IS
KILLING DEMOCRACY (AND HOW WE SAVE IT) 1 (2018) (“In the coming few
years either tech will destroy democracy and the social order as we know it, or
politics will stamp its authority over the digital world. It is becoming increasingly
clear that technology is currently winning this battle, crushing a diminished and
enfeebled opponent.”); Stephen Johnston, Largest Companies 2008 vs. 2018, A
Lot Has Changed, MILFORD (Jan. 31, 2018), https://milfordasset.com/insights/largest-companies-2008-vs-2018-lot-changed (“Technology companies
not only dominate our daily lives (how many times have you checked your iPhone
today?) but also the ranking of world’s biggest companies.”).
8
The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data,
ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/theworlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data.
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activities on their platforms, operating as governors of social communication in the digital age.9 They develop new technologies such
as artificial intelligence (“AI”), acting as decision-makers for the future of humanity.10
With great power, it is often said, comes great responsibility.11
But leading technology companies have thus far reaped their profits
with impunity, demonstrating no commitment to a conception of
corporate responsibility commensurate with the nature and extent of
their ever-expanding powers.12 While the public has invested their
trust and support in technology companies such as Facebook, these
companies have ignored their attendant responsibilities. Instead,

9
See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1603 (2018) (arguing that
“platforms should be thought of as operating as the New Governors of online
speech”); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO.
L.J. 1353, 1357 (2018) (cautioning that technology “corporations’ power over
public discourse today is so concentrated and far-reaching that it resembles and
arguably surpasses state power within its sphere”); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 105 (2018) (concluding that “we’ve
created a new generation of surveillance intermediaries: large, powerful companies that stand between the government and our data and, in the process, help
constrain government surveillance”).
10
See Haochen Sun, The Fundamental Right to Technology, 47 HOFSTRA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (describing how technology companies are developing
AI to dominate the most important industrial sectors).
11
See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015)
(citing S. Lee & S. Ditko, Spider–Man, AMAZING FANTASY, Aug. 1962, at 13
(“[I]n this world, with great power there must also come—great responsibility.”)).
12
See infra Section I.B.4.
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they have created a “black box society”13 and new forms of oppression.14 Privacy breaches have become routine in the technology sector.15 Tax evasion or avoidance by technology companies is occurring more frequently and on a larger scale than ever before, with
Apple being named one of the largest tax avoiders in the United
States16 and Amazon paying no income tax whatsoever.17
Indeed, the major technology companies have been accused of
being even more irresponsible than the financial institutions causing
the 2008 financial crisis.18 The immediate regulatory response has

13

FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 191 (2015) (arguing that the black
box society is unjust because “[d]ata is becoming staggering in its breadth and
depth, yet often the information most important to us is out of our reach, available
only to insiders”).
14
Stephen Hawking has concluded that “[a]longside the benefits, AI will also
bring dangers like powerful autonomous weapons or new ways for the few to oppress the many.” Stephen Hawking Launches Centre for the Future of Intelligence, U.
CAMBRIDGE
(Oct.
19,
2016), https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/the-best-or-worst-thing-to-happen-to-humanity-stephen-hawkinglaunches-centre-for-the-future-of [hereinafter Stephen Hawking Launches Centre]; see also Noel Sharkey, End Technological Injustice! Is Your Face Safe?,
FORBES (Dec. 11, 2018, 10:44 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/noelsharkey/2018/12/11/end-technological-injustice-make-the-safe-face-pledge-today/#754275769af8 (“Everywhere new technology is being exploited to oppress
the already oppressed. Whether you’re a woman, poor, an ethnic minority or just
from the wrong side of the zip code, there’s an algorithm to oppress you.”).
15
Andrew Rossow, Why Data Breaches Are Becoming More Frequent and
What You Need to Do, FORBES (May 23, 2018, 3:12 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewrossow/2018/05/23/why-data-breaches-arebecoming-more-frequent-and-what-you-need-to-do/#256231fad97f.
16
Apple ‘Among Largest Tax Avoiders in US’ — Senate Committee, BBC
(May 21, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-22600984.
17
Glenn Kessler, Does Amazon Pay Any Taxes?, WASH. POST (July 30, 2019,
9:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/live-updates/generalelection/fact-checking-the-second-democratic-debate/does-amazon-pay-anytaxes/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c6710225845a (highlighting Bernie Sanders’s
statement that “[r]ight now, 500,000 Americans are sleeping out on the street and
yet companies like Amazon that made billions in profits did not pay one nickel in
federal income tax”); Vanessa Barford & Gerry Holt, Google, Amazon, Starbucks:
The
Rise
of
‘Tax
Shaming’,
BBC
(May
21,
2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20560359.
18
Saqib Shah, Banks Behind Financial Crash Were Better Behaved Than Facebook, Says Ex-Goldman Sachs President Gary Cohn, SUN (Aug. 7, 2018, 10:13
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been to impose hefty fines upon technology companies. For instance, in July 2019 the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) imposed on Facebook a fine of about $5 billion for its mishandling of
private data.19 Although this is the largest fine the FTC has ever issued,20 it has nonetheless triggered heated debate over whether it is
an effective deterrent. The FTC’s decision was followed by a surge
in Facebook’s stock price, which led to claims that it actually increased Mark Zuckerberg’s net worth. 21 Legislators have proclaimed that the FTC “failed miserably” with this “inadequate” and
“historically hollow” decision, asserting that it is “time for Congress
to act.”22
Against this backdrop, I put forward in this Article the idea of
corporate fundamental responsibility: a new lens through which we
can scrutinize technology companies and address the ethical crisis
surrounding them. Amid a crisis of responsibility, monetary fines—
even staggering ones—are no cure. Punitive measures are backward-looking, reactive, and ultimately inadequate for changing the
behavior of today’s tech behemoths. What is needed, instead, is an
affirmative vision of the nature and scope of the responsibilities that
technology companies should accept.23 To this end, I argue for a tri-

AM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/6958511/banks-more-responsible-than-facebook-says-goldman-sachs (“[B]anks were more responsible citizens in ‘08 than
some of the social-media companies are today. And it affects everyone in the
world. The banks have never had that much pull.”).
19
Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Approves Facebook Fine of About $5 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES (July 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/technology/facebook-ftc-fine.html.
20
Id.
21
Nilay Patel, Facebook’s $5 Billion FTC Fine Is an Embarrassing Joke,
VERGE
(July
12,
2019,
9:05
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/12/20692524/facebook-five-billion-ftc-fine-embarrassing-joke
(reporting the view that “the United States government spent months coming up
with a punishment for Facebook’s long list of privacy-related bad behavior, and
the best it could do was so weak that Facebook’s stock price went up”).
22
Id. (“Senator Ron Wyden has said that the FTC has ‘failed miserably.’ Senator Richard Blumenthal has said the decision is ‘inadequate’ and ‘historically
hollow,’ and Senator Mark Warner has said ‘[i]t’s time for Congress to act.’”).
23
For a detailed account of the affirmative vision of responsibility, see generally YASCHA MOUNK, THE AGE OF RESPONSIBILITY: LUCK, CHOICE, AND THE
WELFARE STATE (2017); JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED
LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013).
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partite conception of corporate responsibility that reflects the realities of the technology industry today. According to this conception,
technology companies should do the following: reciprocate users’
contributions, play their role positively, and confront injustices created by technological development.24
These three fundamental responsibilities are crucial to protecting the public interest and positively shaping humanity’s future.
First, the responsibility to reciprocate would require technology
companies to appreciate users’ contributions and take adequate action to protect their interests.25 Because of this responsibility, technology companies must protect the personal data they collect from
their users. Second, the responsibility to perform their role positively would require technology companies to consider their role in
social communication and innovation.26 This responsibility protects
freedom of expression and promotes responsible innovation. Third,
the responsibility to promote social justice would require technology
companies to confront injustices created by technological development, such as uneven income distribution and labor market polarization,27 and take positive measures to deal with them.28
This concept of corporate fundamental responsibility, as I will
further analyze in this Article, makes three major contributions to
the existing literature and policy discourse on technology, law, and
the public interest. First, it proposes a new approach to applying law
and ethics to deal with the detrimental effects of technology. We are
currently at a crossroads in harnessing technology that will deeply
influence the future of humanity.29 The waves of technological progress seen in recent decades have resulted in such breakthroughs as
3D printing, AI, new medicines, and renewable energy, among
24

See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.A.2.
26
See infra Section II.B.2.
27
See, e.g., CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG
DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 105–22 (2016);
Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment
Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 258 (2018).
28
See infra Section II.C.2.
29
See BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY
1 (2018) (“As we collectively race down the path toward smart techno-social systems that efficiently govern more and more of our lives, we run the risk of losing
ourselves along the way.”).
25
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many others. 30 However, technological breakthroughs have also
raised serious ethical concerns due to their potentially detrimental
effects.31 For example, industrial leaders have cautioned that the recent, rapid development of AI may lead to a third world war 32 or
even bring about humanity’s end.33 Relying on the concept of corporate fundamental responsibility, this Article urges that it is incumbent upon technology companies to seriously consider their role in
minimizing technology’s detrimental effects. To do so, they must
properly respond to the legitimate needs of technology users and
promote social justice.
Second, this Article deals with inadequacies in the conventional
concept of corporate social responsibility in its legal application to
technology companies. Since its inception, the concept of corporate
social responsibility has remained weak and few companies have
ever taken it seriously.34 I contend that companies’ social responsibilities must be made as concrete as possible so that they can serve
30
See ANDREW MCAFEE & ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON, MACHINE, PLATFORM,
CROWD: HARNESSING OUR DIGITAL FUTURE 330 (2017) (“We have more powerful technology at our disposal than ever before, both as individuals and as a society.”).
31
See generally, e.g., MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING
TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS (1977) (discussing the dangerous orientation
of technology); HANS JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF
AN ETHICS FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (1985) (pointing out the threats posed
by modern technology).
32
Alex Hern, Elon Musk Says AI Could Lead to Third World War, GUARDIAN
(Sept.
4,
2017,
6:58
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/04/elon-musk-ai-third-world-war-vladimir-putin;
Catherine
Clifford, Elon Musk: ‘Mark My Words — A.I. Is Far More Dangerous than Nukes’, CNBC (Mar.
13,
2018,
1:22
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/13/elon-musk-at-sxsw-a-i-is-more-dangerousthan-nuclear-weapons.html; Ryan Browne, Alibaba’s Jack Ma Suggests Technology Could Result in a New World War, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2019, 9:29 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/23/alibaba-jack-ma-suggests-technology-couldresult-in-a-new-world-war.html.
33
Stephen Hawking Launches Centre, supra note 14 (reporting Stephen
Hawking’s comment that “the rise of powerful AI will be either the best, or the
worst thing, ever to happen to humanity”).
34
See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6
(2011) (“The many volumes theorizing corporate social responsibility often fail
even to consider the possibility that those providing information services over the
Internet have such responsibilities.”).
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as conduct codes for corporate managers. This concept of corporate
fundamental responsibility clearly identifies three fundamental responsibilities that technology companies must accept. The idea of
corporate social responsibility has not been implemented legally
through legislative reforms and judicial rulings. To address this
problem, I discuss how the concept of corporate fundamental responsibility could be enforced effectively through privacy and intellectual property law. I argue that technology companies should opt
for the highest legal standards—such as those contained in the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”)35—
to protect personal data adequately. 36 Drawing on Federal Trade
Commission v. Qualcomm, Inc.,37 I examine how technology companies should exercise their intellectual property rights responsibly.
Third, this Article offers a constructive solution to a theoretical
as well as a practical issue that the information fiduciary approach
has not yet addressed. This groundbreaking approach, championed
by Professor Jack Balkin, has received a lot of attention. Based on
the conventional fiduciary doctrine, the information fiduciary approach sees technology companies as the fiduciaries of their users’
private data, thereby imposing heightened duties upon corporate
managers in protecting the private data.38 However, this approach
35

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1
[hereinafter GDPR].
36
See infra Section III.A.
37
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Qualcomm Inc., 935 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2019).
38
Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1209 (2016) [hereinafter Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment] (“An information fiduciary is a person or business who, because of their relationship with another, has taken on special duties
with respect to the information they obtain in the course of the relationship. People
and organizations that have fiduciary duties arising from the use and exchange of
information are information fiduciaries whether or not they also do other things
on the client’s behalf, like manage an estate or perform legal or medical services.”); Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1149, 1162 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society] (“Who are the new information fiduciaries in the digital age? They are organizations and enterprises who collect enormous amounts of information about
their end-users.”).
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neglects the concurrent fiduciary duty of corporate managers to
serve their shareholders’ interests.39 While corporate managers must
protect users’ interests in personal data as the information fiduciary
approach suggests, they must also fulfill their fiduciary duties to
maximize their shareholders’ interests.40 A major problem with the
information fiduciary approach, therefore, is its inability to address
this potential conflict.
Without relying on the conventional fiduciary doctrine, the concept of corporate fundamental responsibility applies the ethical theories of reciprocity, role responsibility, and social justice. As I will
show in this Article, this concept offers a theoretical account of why
the fundamental responsibilities of technology companies could
trump corporate managers’ fiduciary duty to shareholders of these
companies. Moreover, the concept deals not only with the protection
of private data but also responsible use of intellectual property by
technology companies, which is an issue of pivotal importance for
guarding the public interest.41
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. In Part I,
I reveal that both the shareholder value theory and U.S. legal reforms
of the past twenty years or so have led technology companies to neglect their fundamental responsibilities. I then put forward in Part II
the concept of corporate fundamental responsibility. Drawing on the
39

See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976–77 (Del. 1977) (noting
that under Delaware law, officers, directors, and controlling shareholders are corporate fiduciaries), overruled on other grounds by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
40
See Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 503 (2019) (“Balkin’s central example of a
purported information fiduciary, Facebook, is a Delaware corporation. So are his
other main examples, Google, Twitter, and Uber. Under Delaware law, the officers and directors of a for-profit corporation already owe fiduciary duties — to the
corporation and its stockholders.”); Philip Lynch, Human Rights and Corporate
Social Responsibility: An Australian Perspective, 1 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV.
402, 416 (2006) (pointing out that charity schemes in favor of social and environmental interests should be “subverted to shareholders’ financial interests to the
extent of any incompatibility or inconsistency”).
41
See Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 60 (2019) (pointing out that “the true potential of AI
does not lie in the information we reveal to one another, but rather, in the questions
they raise about the interaction of technology, intellectual property, and civil
rights”).
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ethical theories of reciprocity, role responsibility, and social justice,
I discuss how and why three fundamental responsibilities should be
imposed upon technology companies. In Part III, I further analyze
how these responsibilities could be enforced legally and ethically to
protect personal data and promote responsible use of intellectual
property by technology companies.
I.

CREATING THE AGE OF IRRESPONSIBILITY

A. Theoretical Support for Minimizing Responsibilities
For decades, shareholder value theory has catalyzed the minimization of technology companies’ responsibilities, leading the world
to fully support the maximization of their wealth growth as they continue to innovate new technologies. This theory first emerged as a
dominant and influential school of thought in shaping the development of corporate responsibilities to society. 42 Nobel Laureate in
Economics Milton Friedman was the main champion of this theory.
In Capitalism and Freedom, published in 1962, he stated the following:
The view has been gaining widespread acceptance
that corporate officials and labor leaders have a “social responsibility” that goes beyond serving the interest of their stockholders or their members. This
view shows a fundamental misconception of the
character and nature of a free economy. In such an
economy, there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it
stays within the rules of the game, which is to say,
engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.43

42

See Domènec Melé, Corporate Social Responsibility Theories, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 47, 56 (Andrew
Crane et al. eds., 2008) (pointing out that shareholder value theory “has been dominant in many business schools”).
43
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).
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According to this opinion, the only social responsibility of a
company is to make as much profit as possible for its shareholders.
To this end, the directors of a company, who serve as agents managing the company for the shareholders as principals, should make
decisions designed to maximize shareholders’ interests. 44 Therefore, corporate directors’ responsibility is solely to serve shareholders’ interests rather than societal interests at large.45
Against this backdrop, shareholder value theory categorically
denies that companies should be legally required to take any social
responsibility. 46 In Friedman’s eyes, companies are, by nature,
profit-maximizing institutions. 47 As long as they pursue profitdriven agendas legally, the law must not impose any social responsibilities upon them. 48 Social responsibility initiatives would directly prevent corporate directors from wholeheartedly serving
shareholders’ interests, thereby indirectly undermining the bedrock
of a free economy.49
Shareholder value theory has been applied to fundamentally
shape corporate law’s exclusion of social responsibilities and effectively defy corporate social responsibility initiatives. Based upon
44

Friedman further clarified his opinion in a later New York Times article,
stating that “the manager is the agent of the individuals who own the corporation
or establish the eleemosynary institution, and his primary responsibility is to
them.” Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33.
45
Id. (“[A] corporate executive . . . has direct responsibility to conduct the
business in accordance with [shareholder] desires, which generally will be to
make as much money as possible while conforming to [the] basic rules of the
society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”).
46
José Salazar & Bryan W. Husted, Principals and Agents: Further Thoughts
on the Friedmanite Critique of Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 42, at 137, 150
(“Friedman’s original critique of corporate social responsibility remains one of
the most important in the CSR literature.”).
47
FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 33 (“[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say,
engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.”).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 135 (stating that of “the claim that business should contribute to the
support of charitable activities and especially to universities” that “[s]uch giving
by corporations is an inappropriate use of corporate funds in a free-enterprise society”).
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this theory, U.S. corporate law treats companies as profit-maximizing institutions and thereby imposes no social responsibilities upon
them.50 The fiduciary duty doctrine epitomizes the law’s espousal of
shareholder value theory.51 Pursuant to this doctrine, the directors of
a company, in carrying out their managerial tasks, are charged with
certain fiduciary duties to the shareholders of the company.52 The
doctrine primarily imposes a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. The
duty of care requires that “prior to making a business decision,” directors inform themselves “of all material information reasonably
available to them.” 53 Rather than simply accept information presented to them, directors must assess this information with a “critical
eye” in order to protect the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.54 The duty of loyalty requires that, in serving as corporate
fiduciaries, the directors and officers of a company should make all
decisions in good faith and in the best interest of the shareholders.55
Therefore, this duty elevates “stockholder welfare as the only end”
of corporate decisions, thereby only allowing the consideration of

50

It is worth noting that corporate tax should be deemed a compulsory legal
duty under tax law rather than a social responsibility.
51
See Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership
and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 464 (2001) (“A director’s duty of loyalty is another type of legal rule that can help to provide a
protective environment for investors [because] . . . managerial self-dealing will
potentially constitute breaches of duty.”); Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90
AM. ECON. REV. 22, 26 (2000) (discussing how the duties of loyalty and care are
important in protecting minority shareholder rights, which promotes the development of capital markets).
52
See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824 (N.J. 1981); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986); Polk v. Good, 507
A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986).
53
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). In practice, whether the
directors were informed of all the relevant information depends on the quality of
the information, the advice available, and whether the directors had “sufficient
opportunity to acquire knowledge concerning the problem before acting.” Moran
v. Household Intern., Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1075 (Del. Ch. 1985).
54
Smith v. Van Gorkem, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
55
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, “[c]orporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further
their private interests.” Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
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“other interests” that are “rationally related to stockholder welfare.”56
Due to the dominance of shareholder value theory in policymaking, theorist and activist campaigns for corporate social responsibility have produced only limited effects. Scholars have put forward ethical responsibility and corporate citizenship theories to justify corporate social responsibility. These theories have lent strong
support to the creation of corporate social responsibility initiatives
such as the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights.57 However, only a tiny proportion of major corporations in the world are members of such initiatives.58
Having instead focused on issues such as environmental protection, scholars and policy-makers have not yet comprehensively scrutinized the relationship between corporate social responsibility and
technology companies.59 In fact, in the past twenty years or so, the
major technology companies have been largely immune from scrutiny over whether they should have strong social responsibilities imposed upon them. Many scholars and policy-makers have forcefully
argued that technology companies—in particular online intermediaries—should bear as few responsibilities as possible. Otherwise,
technology companies would be financially over-burdened and their
innovation would ultimately be stifled, resulting in graver financial
losses.60 Following this line of reasoning, Congress adopted laws
minimizing the responsibilities of online intermediaries.61

56

Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108, 2017 WL
1437308, at *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2017).
57
U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business
Enterprises
with
Regard
to
Human
Rights, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
58
Alwyn Lim & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, The Social Regulation of the Economy in
the Global Context, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A GLOBALIZING
WORLD 12 (Kiyoteru Tsutsui & Alwyn Lim eds., 2015).
59
Id. at 8–9.
60
See Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639,
645 (2014) [hereinafter Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley] (discussing
these policy arguments).
61
Id.
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The upshot of the minimization of technology companies’ responsibilities is that the whole world cares too much about the economic value of these companies. Those who invest in technology
companies are primarily interested in whether these companies can
eventually go public and how much their stock value will soar. The
media has become a cheerleader, following and reporting technology companies’ stock market listing successes.62 Therefore, as technology companies’ wealth has skyrocketed, they have been immune
from ethical scrutiny of their responsibilities.63
B. Legal Support for Minimizing Responsibilities
Swayed by the shareholder value theory, the U.S. Congress has
enacted major statutes to minimize the legal liability of technology
companies with respect to online infringing acts, privacy protection,
and payment of taxes. However, these legal reforms have had the
unintended consequence of breeding a mentality of irresponsibility
among many technology companies.64
1. EXEMPTING LIABILITIES OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS
In the 1990s, reforms of intermediary platforms’ legal liabilities
contributed tremendously to the rapid growth of technology companies. Under the Clinton administration, laws and regulations that
hindered electronic commerce were reviewed, and in some cases

62
See Ryan Chittum, The Press and the Tech Bubble, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. (Apr. 9, 2014), https://archives.cjr.org/the_audit/thinking_about_the_bubble.php.
63
A notable exception is the recent media discussion about Uber’s IPO. See,
e.g., Farhad Manjoo, The Uber I.P.O. Is a Moral Stain on Silicon Valley, N.Y.
TIMES (May 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/01/opinion/uberipo.html.
64
See Haochen Sun, Copyright and Responsibility, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. 263, 271 (2013) [hereinafter Sun, Copyright] (explaining how “us[ing]
the language of rights and its rhetorical power” can cause irresponsibility mentality); SCOTT VEITCH, LAW AND IRRESPONSIBILITY: ON THE LEGITIMATION OF
HUMAN SUFFERING 72 (2007) (“Immunised by the mechanisms of responsibility
transference, underpinned by the naturalised economic realm of rights to private
property upheld at almost any cost by state institutions, the irresponsible mentality
appears not only as widely prevalent, but as legitimate. And such organized irresponsibility and legitimised immunities are call ‘the law.’”).
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eliminated, to respond to the needs of a new era of digital technology.65
The first stage of legal reforms dealt with the extent to which
Internet service providers should be shielded from civil liability for
online infringing acts. Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) in 1996 as a legal tool to give Internet service
providers immunity from their platform users’ illegal activities, such
as spreading defamatory information and provoking racial discrimination.66 Before 1996, judicial rulings had exposed Internet service
providers to high risks, holding them accountable for illegal activities occurring on their platforms. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,67 an investment firm sued Prodigy, an Internet service provider, for defamation based on comments by a third party
on Prodigy’s online bulletin boards.68 Because of its editorial control, Prodigy was found liable as the publisher of the bulletin board
content created by its users.69 By overruling Stratton Oakmont, §
230 of the CDA provides that Internet service providers should not
be treated as publishers of material that they did not develop, 70
thereby generally protecting them from liability for user-generated
content.
Given that § 230 does not deal with intellectual property
claims,71 the second stage of legal reforms dealt with the extent to
which Internet service providers should be exempted from copyright
liabilities arising from online infringing acts. The online platforms
operated by Internet service providers allowed their users to reproduce and disseminate copyrighted works with unprecedented ease.
The frequency with which users might infringe copyrights exposed
Internet service providers to contributory or vicarious liabilities to a

65

William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce: Read the Framework, CLINTON WHITE HOUSE, https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html (last visited Jan.
18, 2020).
66
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 501–61, 110
Stat. 56, 133–43 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 47 U.S.C.).
67
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
68
Id. at *1.
69
Id. at *7.
70
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018).
71
Id. § 230(e)(2).
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dire and unmanageable extent.72 In this context, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) was enacted in 1998 to set up a safe
harbour for Internet service providers, shielding them from liability
for their users’ infringements of copyright.73
The DMCA has contributed positively to the legitimacy and survival of Internet service providers. One of DMCA’s primary legislative objectives was to preserve “strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with
copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment.” 74 This collaboration operates as a notice-and-takedown system, whereby copyright owners have the right to order Internet service providers to remove works and in return the latter are
immunized from copyright infringement liabilities.75
2. WEAKENING PRIVACY PROTECTION
The current privacy protection regime in the U.S. is focused on
addressing technological innovation. Not only is there a lack of
strong privacy regulations and laws, but the existing laws appear to
accommodate the interests of technology companies.76

72
BRIAN YEH & ROBIN JEWELER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32037, SAFE
HARBOR FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS UNDER THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT
ACT 1 (2004).
73
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 201–03, 112
Stat. 2860, 2877–86 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 17,
28, and 35 U.S.C.).
74
H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 72 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
75
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(b)(E), (c)(C), (d)(3) (2018).
76
A lax privacy regime allows Internet service providers to accumulate high
profits while also allowing for greater innovation. For instance, Chander notices
that many Internet services rely upon a trial-and-error for innovation. Chander,
How Law Made Silicon Valley, supra note 60, at 666–67. What this means is that
Internet services may test out new products or programs on their website and see
how users respond. Id. Depending on this response, their product or program can
be retracted completely or modified. Id. This type of experimentation allows these
Internet companies to respond quickly to the market. Id. This reveals how weak
privacy laws have actually enabled high technology firms to flourish into corporations worth billions of dollars.
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The U.S. privacy protection regime has been accused of being
generally less robust than its E.U. counterpart.77 This stems partly
from the weak status of information privacy in the U.S. Constitution.
In terms of privacy protection, the Constitution only guards against
intrusion by the government, thereby playing little role in governing
breach of privacy by private actors.78 In this sense, the free flow of
information through private transactions has been given priority
over the right to privacy. Further, the Constitution does not protect
privacy as a fundamental right. Rather, this right is accepted as implied in the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.79
The United States also lacks a single, coherent and comprehensive federal law that regulates the collection and use of personal data.
Instead, it has chosen to implement sector-specific (e.g., financial
institutions, healthcare entities, and communications common carriers) and type of information-specific (e.g., children’s information on
the Internet) federal data protection laws, complemented by state
laws, administrative regulations, and industry specific self-regulatory guidelines.80 This sectoral approach to personal data protection
can be seen as a piecemeal response to privacy issues arising in specific sectors that leaves large areas, such as collection of personal
data, unregulated in the age of big data and AI.81 The mishmash of
federal, state, and industry regulations create overlapping and contradictory protections. Furthermore, these data privacy laws are
largely based on the principles of both tort law and contract law,
which can result in conflicting interpretations and applications.82

77

See, e.g., Shawn Marie Boyne, Data Protection in the United States, 66
AM. J. COMP. L. 299, 299 n.3 (2018); Svetlana Yakovleva, Privacy Protection(ism): The Latest Wave of Trade Constraints on Regulatory Autonomy, 74 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 416, 473–81 (2020).
78
Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy
Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115, 155 (2017).
79
U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, XIV.
80
Boyne, supra note 77, at 299.
81
See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014); Avner Levin & Mary Jo
Nicholson, Privacy Law in the United States, the EU and Canada: The Allure of
the Middle Ground, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 357, 361–67 (2005).
82
Carolyn Hoang, In the Middle: Creating a Middle Road Between U.S. and
EU Data Protection Policies, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 810, 843
(2012).
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Moreover, the absence of a designated central data protection
authority has been another factor contributing to weak protection of
personal data in the United States. 83 The FTC has essentially assumed responsibility for consumer protection, which covers the
online protection of personal data. 84 However, the FTC can only
provide limited protection due to inherent problems in the Federal
Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”).85 Section 45(a) of the FTCA is
seen as restrictive, as it only enables users to sue in cases where an
Internet service provider has committed “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.”86 It essentially means, as Professor Anupam Chander notes, that “as long as the services do not
promise more privacy than they actually deliver, online companies
in the United States have a free hand with information.”87
3. PROVIDING TAX DEDUCTION INCENTIVES
Legal reforms also pushed for the provision of tax incentives to
technology companies. In 1998, the U.S. Congress enacted the Internet Tax Freedom Act (“ITFA”).88 The underpinnings of this Act
were to promote the growth and development of the Internet and its
commercial, educational, and informational potential at a time when
its preservation was seen as a necessity.89 As Conyers states, “[t]he
act was intended as a temporary measure to assist and nurture the

83
Steven Chabinsky & F. Paul Pittman, USA: Data Protection 2019, ICLG
(Mar. 7, 2019), https://iclg.com/practice-areas/data-protection-laws-and-regulations/usa.
84
See generally Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection (last
visited Jan. 18, 2020) (explaining that “[t]he FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection stops unfair, deceptive and fraudulent business practices by collecting complaints and conducting investigations, suing companies and people that break the
law, developing rules to maintain a fair marketplace, and educating consumers
and businesses about their rights and responsibilities”).
85
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018).
86
Id. at § 45(a)(1).
87
Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, supra note 60, at 667.
88
Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
89
Grant Gross, U.S. House Approves Permanent Ban on Internet Access
Taxes, PC WORLD (July 15, 2014, 12:03 PM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2454420/us-house-approves-permanent-ban-on-internet-access-taxes.html.
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fledgling Internet that back in 1998 was still in its commercial infancy.”90 The ITFA prevented state and local governments from taxing Internet access or imposing multiple or discriminatory taxes on
electronic commerce.91 As a result, exposure and support for what
are now billion-dollar Internet companies such as Google were not
compromised.
Moreover, the U.S. government supports business research and
development (“R&D”) through direct R&D funding as well as tax
incentives. In the U.S. federal tax system, two tax incentives are provided for business R&D investment. The first is an unlimited expensing allowance for qualified research spending. 92 The second
and most important is the research and experimentation tax credit,
which provides a non-refundable income tax credit for qualified
R&D expenditures.93 This corporate R&D tax credit was established
in 1981 with the aim of incentivizing technological innovation in
response to the decline in R&D expenditures relative to the real
gross national product from 1968 to 1979.94 The recent tax reform
increases the tax value of the R&D tax credit indirectly and encourages corporations to relocate their R&D activities back to the United
States.95 The maximum assistance available to large corporates by
way of R&D tax credit is 15.8% of qualified research expenditure.96
90

Id.
Id.
92
26 U.S.C. § 174 (2012).
93
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221, 95 Stat.
172, 241–47.
94
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 119–20 (Comm.
Print 1981) (“In the case of research and development activities conducted by
business, company-financed and Federal expenditures over the 12-year period
1968–79 remained at a fairly stable level in real terms, fluctuating between $19
and $22.8 billion in constant dollars. Relative to real gross national product, such
expenditures for company research declined from 2.01 percent in 1968 to 1.58
percent in 1975, essentially remaining at that level since then.”).
95
ERNST & YOUNG, R&D INCENTIVES CONTINUE TO DRAW GOVERNMENT
FAVOR: REFLECTIONS FROM EY’S THE OUTLOOK FOR GLOBAL TAX POLICY IN
2018 9 (2018), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-rd-incentivesin-2018/$FILE/ey-rd-incentives-in-2018.pdf.
96
DELOITTE, SURVEY OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT AND INNOVATION
INCENTIVES
269
(2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-survey-of-global-investmentand-innovation-incentives.pdf.
91
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Major technology companies have benefited tremendously from
tax incentive regimes. For instance, Tesla received a $1.25 billion
tax break over twenty years for its deal to build a battery factory in
Nevada, and Apple received a $214 million tax break for setting up
a data center in Iowa.97 Tax incentives like these are of importance
to technology companies, especially those in the start-up period. For
a lot of start-up companies in the technology field, finding and keeping the right technically skilled workers can be a challenge and their
revenues may be low while costs soar.98 Presenting firms with tax
incentives, therefore, helps stabilize their workforce.99
4. BREEDING A MENTALITY OF IRRESPONSIBILITY
Although the lax regulatory system introduced by the statutes
discussed above undoubtedly promoted innovation, it has created an
environment in which technology companies have been able to act
irresponsibly. Without users’ knowledge or consent, these companies have disclosed personal data to third parties and/or used private
data for targeted advertising.
Beyond the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Facebook has misused private data in a considerable number of incidents. In 2011,
Facebook agreed to settle FTC charges alleging it had made false
and misleading material statements to its users related to user privacy.100 Facebook deceived its users by assuring them they could

97
Ron Miller, Amazon Isn’t the Only Tech Company Getting Tax Breaks,
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 25, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/25/amazon-isnt-the-only-tech-company-getting-tax-breaks.
98
Lynda Finan, Government Investment in Technology: How Governments
Use Tax Regimes to Attract R&D Activity, DLA PIPER (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2018/01/government-investment-in-technology.
99
Id. Tax incentives allow high tech firms to focus on research and development. Research and development lead to innovation, and, in a highly competitive
field like technology, innovation is crucial for business survival. The United Kingdom has set out objectives such as a $2.3 billion investment into research and
development in 2021 and 2022 in order to secure themselves as the most innovative nation by 2030. Id. This objective of the United Kingdom perfectly demonstrates the importance of research and development, and, thus, highlights why tax
incentives can be of high importance for technology firms.
100
Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers by Failing to
Keep Privacy Promises, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Nov. 29, 2011),
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keep their information on Facebook private, and then, without their
knowledge or consent, repeatedly allowing it to be shared and made
public. 101 It was reported that Facebook had harvested the email
contacts of 1.5 million users without their knowledge or consent
since May 2016, asking new users for email passwords and then importing email contacts without users’ permission.102 Due to a software glitch, Google inadvertently exposed the name, email addresses, age and other personal information of 52.5 million Google+
users to third party developers between 2015 and March 2018,103
causing Google to accelerate its plan to shut down Google+. 104
However, it was reported that Google intentionally opted not to disclose the incident as early as possible, partly because it was worried
the incident would trigger “immediate regulatory interest” and lead
to reputational damage.105
Moreover, technology companies have irresponsibly operated
targeted advertising by taking advantage of users’ personal data
without their consent. If a user searches for a product using Google’s
search engine service, an advertisement for the same product may
appear on their Instagram feed shortly afterwards. Internet users are
also likely to be familiar with variations of the statement “this website uses cookies for the best possible search experience.” In this
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftccharges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep.
101
Id. The settlement agreement, which became final in 2012, prohibited Facebook from misrepresenting the extent to which it maintained their data privacy
and security and required Facebook to seek express consent from its users before
sharing their information beyond their privacy settings. Facebook, Inc., 0923184
F.T.C. No. C-4365, at 3–4 (2012); see also FTC Approves Final Settlement with
Facebook, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2012/08/ftc-approves-final-settlement-facebook.
102
Rob Price, Facebook Says it ‘Unintentionally Uploaded’ 1.5 Million People’s Email Contacts Without Their Consent, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 17, 2019, 8:07
PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-uploaded-1-5-million-usersemail-contacts-without-permission-2019-4?r=US&IR=T.
103
Douglas MacMillan & Robert McMillan, Google Exposed User Data,
Feared Repercussions of Disclosing to Public, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-exposed-user-data-feared-repercussionsof-disclosing-to-public-1539017194; Lily Hay Newman, A New Google+ Blunder Exposed Data From 52.5 Million Users, WIRED (Dec. 10, 2018, 2:19 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/google-plus-bug-52-million-users-data-exposed/.
104
MacMillan & McMillan, supra note 103.
105
Id.
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way, technology companies have gone beyond their roles as search
engine service providers and social media outlets. Rather, they are
shrewdly run billion-dollar corporations depending heavily on advertising. For instance, in 2018, Facebook made more than $50 billion in advertising revenue; 98.5% of its total revenue.106 Targeted
advertisements are specifically transmitted to individuals by utilizing personal data collected by technology companies routinely and
without the targets’ consent.107 How much a technology company
knows about an individual will determine how much money it can
make.108
Before the overhaul of the U.S. tax system in 2017, a federal
corporate income tax was imposed on U.S. companies at a rate of
35% of their worldwide profits.109 However, companies could indefinitely defer payment of taxes on profits earned abroad as long
as these profits were retained offshore.110 The difference in tax rates
between the United States and overseas jurisdictions incentivized
many U.S.-based multinational companies to adjust their corporate
structures to enjoy the tax benefits.
Apple, for example, took advantage of such a tax gap between
United States and offshore jurisdictions. It transferred large amounts
of its profits to offshore subsidiaries in tax havens such as Ireland
and the Channel Island of Jersey to avoid tens of billions of dollars
in U.S. taxes.111 In 2016, the European Commission found that Ire-

106
Matthew Johnston, How Facebook Makes Money: Advertising Dominates
Revenue, but Growth Is Slowing, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/120114/how-does-facebook-fb-make-money.asp
(last updated Jan. 12, 2020).
107
See Louise Matsakis, Facebook’s Targeted Ads Are More Complex than It
Lets On, WIRED (Apr. 25, 2018, 4:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebooks-targeted-ads-are-more-complex-than-it-lets-on/.
108
Joanna Glasner, What Search Sites Know About You, WIRED (Apr. 5,
2005, 2:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2005/04/what-search-sites-knowabout-you/.
109
Jesse Drucker, How Tax Bills Would Reward Companies That Moved
Money Offshore, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/business/taxes-offshore-repatriation.html.
110
Id.
111
Jesse Drucker & Simon Bowers, The Paradise Papers: After a Tax Crackdown, Apple Found a New Shelter for Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/apple-taxes-jersey.html.
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land gave illegal state aid to Apple by levying lower than 1% effective corporate tax on Apple, where the prevailing Irish corporate tax
rate was 12.5%.112 Apple saved €13 billion in taxes because of the
aid.113
Congress enacted the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017.114 The Act
reduces the tax rate on money repatriated to the United States from
35% to 15.5%.115 Amazon has been a beneficiary of the tax cuts.116
Although it earned more than $11 billion in profits in 2018, it paid
zero federal corporate income tax owing to the reduction in tax rates
for corporations, carry-forward losses from previous years, R&D tax
credit and stock-based employee compensation. 117 Furthermore,
Amazon received a $129 million federal income tax rebate, which
made its tax rate -1%.118
II.

JUSTIFYING THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
How should we deal with irresponsible technology companies?
Statutes and regulatory measures were adopted largely on the assumption that these companies, in the startup stage, had little financial capacity and that minimizing their responsibilities would incentivize the development of innovative services and products. However, as discussed in the Introduction, the situation is now drastically

112
David Meyer, Apple Has Paid the $14.3 Billion It Owes the Irish Tax Authorities—But the Check Hasn’t Cleared Yet, FORTUNE (Sept. 19, 2018, 5:58
AM), https://fortune.com/2018/09/19/apple-ireland-tax-payments-escrow.
113
Ireland Forced to Collect Apple’s Disputed €13Bn Tax Bill, BBC (Dec. 5,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42237312.
114
Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2018)).
115
What’s in the Final Republican Tax Bill, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2017, 11:43
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-provisions-factbox/whats-inthe-final-republican-tax-bill-idUSKBN1ED27K.
116
Andrew Davis, Why Amazon Paid No 2018 US Federal Income Tax,
CNBC (Apr. 4, 2019, 6:10 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/03/why-amazon-paid-no-federal-income-tax.html.
117
Id.
118
Laura Stampler, Amazon Will Pay a Whopping $0 in Federal Taxes on
$11.2 Billion Profits, FORTUNE (Feb. 14, 2019, 3:34 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/02/14/amazon-doesnt-pay-federal-taxes-2019.
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different. As beneficiaries of those lax statutory and regulatory arrangements, the major technology companies are now among the
richest and most sophisticated in the world.
It is high time to redefine the nature and scope of technology
companies’ responsibilities. Drawing on the ethical theories of reciprocity, role responsibility, and social justice, I discuss how and
why three corporate fundamental responsibilities should be imposed
upon technology companies: reciprocating users’ contributions,
playing roles positively, and confronting injustices created by technological development.
A. The Responsibility to Reciprocate
1. RECIPROCITY
As an ethical norm, reciprocity requires that one should respond
to a positive action from another by returning proportionately his or
her positive action.119 Aristotle used friendship, one of the most basic
human relationships, to illustrate the importance of reciprocity. According to him, positive friendship is a relationship in which two persons treat each other as equals and are willing to reciprocate each
other’s admiration and good deeds.120 By contrast, negative friendship develops without the intention to reciprocate because the two
persons only care about their own utility or pleasure.121 Central to reciprocity, therefore, is that people must assume responsibility to take
positive action in return for others’ kindness.122 Cicero regarded this

119

See LAWRENCE C. BECKER, RECIPROCITY 3 (1986). Conversely, reciprocity also allows one to respond to a negative action from another—such as a harmful or hurtful action—with indifference or retaliation. Id.; see also FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 11
(1995) (“Law, contract, and economic rationality . . . must as well be leavened
with reciprocity, moral obligation, duty toward community, and trust . . . . The
latter are not anachronisms in a modern society but rather the sine qua non of the
latter’s success.”).
120
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VIII, at 147, 149 (Roger Crisp ed.
& trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“It is bad people who will
tend to be friends for pleasure or utility . . . . But good people will be friends for
each other’s sake . . . .”).
121
Id. at 149.
122
See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 72 (2000) (“The core idea of [human nature] is that of
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as the bedrock of all ethical norms, emphasizing that “there is no more
essential duty than that of returning kindness received; to omit the
returning of kindness is impossible for a good man.”123
Reciprocity is universally accepted and practiced because of its
intrinsic value in stabilizing interpersonal relationships and societal
institutions.124 The ethos of reciprocity requires the recipient of a positive action to overcome his or her selfish impulses and consider how
he or she could act in return in another’s interest.125 Therefore, it provides the original positive actor with the expectation that kindness
will ultimately be responded to positively.126 Through the repetition
of reciprocal actions, people become more willing to initiate positive
deeds for others and respond to others’ positive deeds.127
Reciprocity involves two specific responsibilities. First, people
have the responsibility to appreciate positive actions done by others
for them.128 They should be willing to recognize benefits received and
identify ways in which those benefits have promoted their well-being.
This process of appreciation motivates one to take reciprocal action.
Indifference to others’ positive actions will preclude any possibility
of reflecting on the positive consequences of those actions.
Second, people have the responsibility to act in return for benefits
received as a result of others’ actions. Central to “[r]eciprocity is a
moral idea situated between impartiality, which is altruistic, on the
one side and mutual advantage on the other.”129 Reciprocation may
the human being as a dignified free being who shapes his or her own life in cooperation and reciprocity with others, rather than being passively shaped or pushed
around by the world in the manner of a ‘flock’ or ‘herd’ animal.”).
123
Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Officiis, in ETHICAL WRITINGS OF CICERO 32
(Andrew P. Peabody, trans., 1887).
124
See Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 161, 171–76 (1960); see DAVID SCHMIDTZ, THE
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 79 (2006) (arguing that reciprocity induces cooperation
and “enables people to live together in mutually respectful peace”).
125
See, e.g., Gouldner, supra note 124, at 170.
126
Id.
127
See GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 387 (Kurt H.
Wolff ed. & trans., The Free Press 1950) (concluding that social equilibrium and
cohesion only exist because of “the reciprocity of service and return service”).
128
See, e.g., SCHMIDTZ, supra note 124, at 76 (“The art of reciprocity is partly
an art of graciously acknowledging favors.”).
129
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 77 (Erin Kelly ed.,
2001).
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apply a mathematical formula, for example, in the case of a party who
must pay off a specific amount of debt owed to the other party according to the contract between them.130 More frequently, reciprocation takes the form of actions such as expressing appreciation verbally
or in writing, or providing assistance or care.131
2. RECIPROCITY AND TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES
How should technology companies deal with the ethics of reciprocity? In this Section, I identify how users of technology companies’ services have contributed to technology companies’ market successes. I further argue that technology companies should take the responsibility to first appreciate users’ contributions and then to consider how they should reciprocate by proactively protecting users’ interests.
First, users have created a vast array of content, which has contributed immensely to the rapid development and success of social
media platforms. As of January 2019, the number of active social
media users had reached 3.48 billion.132 A statistics report shows
that Facebook users posted 510,000 comments, updated 293,000
user statuses, and uploaded 136,000 photos every minute in January

See SIMMEL, supra note 127, at 387 (commenting that “[a]ll contacts
among men rest on the schema of giving and returning the equivalence”).
131
See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 30 (2000)
(“The conditions of equal opportunity to speak and freedom from domination encourage all to express their needs and interests. The equality condition also requires a reciprocity such that each acknowledges that the interests of the others
must be taken into account in order to reach a judgement.”).
132
SIMON KEMP, DIGITAL 2019: ESSENTIAL INSIGHTS INTO HOW PEOPLE
AROUND THE WORLD USE THE INTERNET, MOBILE DEVICES, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND
E-COMMERCE 7 (2019), https://p.widencdn.net/kqy7ii/Digital2019-Report-en.
Facebook monthly active users have increased from 100 million in the third quarter of 2008 to 2.45 billion in the third quarter of 2019. J. Clement, Number of
Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 3rd Quarter 2019 (in Millions),
STATISTA (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/numberof-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide. In December 2010, the number of
active monthly users of Instagram was 1 million; as of June 2018, it was 1 billion.
Josh Constine, Instagram Hits 1 Billion Monthly Users, Up From 800M in September,
TECHCRUNCH
(June
20,
2018,
1:58
PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/20/instagram-1-billion-users.
130
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2020.133 As of May 2019, YouTube’s two billion monthly active users134 had uploaded more than 500 hours of video per minute.135
Second, users have contributed substantially to technology companies’ advertising revenues. Advertising has become the major
source of revenue for many of these companies.136 It was reported
that Internet advertising revenues in the United States increased to
$107.5 billion in 2018. 137 Facebook’s advertising revenue nearly
doubled from $8.63 billion for the fourth quarter of 2016 to $16.64
billion for the fourth quarter of 2018. 138 Ostensibly, advertisers
choose social media outlets as the major advertising platforms because of the size of the audience they offer.139
Third, users contribute positively to technology companies’ innovation capacities. For example, AI-powered applications require
a vast amount of training data for their development. Apart from
133

Dan Noyes, The Top 20 Valuable Facebook Statistics, ZEPHORIA,
https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics (last updated Jan. 2020).
As of June 2016, Instagram users were contributing 95 million posts every day.
Yasmeen Abutaleb, Instagram’s User Base Grows to More Than 500 Million,
REUTERS (June 21, 2016, 9:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-instagram-users/instagrams-user-base-grows-to-more-than-500-millionidUSKCN0Z71LN.
134
Adam Warner, Which Social Media Platform Has the Most Users? [2020
DISCUSSION], WEBSITE PLANET, https://www.websiteplanet.com/blog/socialmedia-platform-users (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
135
James Hale, More Than 500 Hours of Content Are Now Being Uploaded
to YouTube Every Minute, TUBEFILTER (May 7, 2019), https://www.tubefilter.com/2019/05/07/number-hours-video-uploaded-to-youtube-per-minute.
136
See BARTLETT, supra note 7, at 12.
137
See PwC, IAB INTERNET ADVERTISING REVENUE REPORT: 2018 FULL
RESULTS 2 (2019), https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Full-Year2018-IAB-Internet-Advertising-Revenue-Report.pdf.
138
Amy Gesenhues, Facebook Ad Revenue Tops $16.6 billion, Driven by Instagram, Stories, MARTECH TODAY (Jan. 31, 2019, 12:20 PM), https://martechtoday.com/despite-ongoing-criticism-facebook-generates-16-6-billion-in-ad-revenue-during-q4-up-30-yoy-230261. In 2016, Instagram earned $1.61 billion from
advertising in the United States; in 2018 this rose to $6.18 billion. Blake Droesch,
Instagram’s New Explore Ads Signal Potential Changes to Organic Reach,
EMARKETER (July 9, 2019), https://www.emarketer.com/content/instagramsnew-explore-ads-signal-potential-changes-to-organic-reach.
139
See KEITH A. QUESENBERRY, SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGY: MARKETING,
ADVERTISING, AND PUBLIC RELATIONS IN THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION 8–9
(2015) (discussing that social media operates in user-centric modes and its profound influence over users).

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

927

training datasets purchased from data brokers, training data can also
be amassed from the Internet.140 Therefore, users’ activities on the
Internet generate a huge amount of data that is useful for the training
and development of AI. In late 2015, Google rolled out its Inbox
Smart Reply feature providing automatic email response suggestions.141 Smart Reply used AI to read incoming emails, understand
the content, and then automatically generate up to three responses
from which users could select.142 The Smart Reply algorithm was
trained on a corpus of 238 million email messages.143 These email
messages were presumably sourced from Gmail accounts.144
Similarly, facial recognition technologies take advantage of images contributed by users.145 The photos that people store and share
on social media platforms and image hosting sites provide face image data for computers to recognize, identify, and analyze faces.
When users tag friends in photos, these labeled faces can be used to
train facial recognition AI. For example, Facebook used 4.4 million
images of labelled faces of more than 4000 individuals to develop
its facial recognition technology known as DeepFace.146 IBM extracted nearly a million photos from a dataset of the image hosting
site Flickr for its facial recognition project.147

140

See, e.g., James Vincent, Google is Testing a New Way of Training its AI
Algorithms Directly on Your Phone, THE VERGE (Apr. 10, 2017, 6:38 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/4/10/15241492/google-ai-user-data-federatedlearning.
141
Arjun Kharpal, Google’s New Feature Will Reply to Emails for You,
CNBC (Nov. 3, 2015, 12:07 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/03/google-machine-learning-reply-emails-gmail.html.
142
Id.
143
Anjuli Kannan et al., Smart Reply: Automated Response Suggestion for
Email, KDD’16: PROC. 22ND ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE
DISCOVERY & DATA MINING, Aug. 2016, at 955, 962.
144
Id.
145
See FERNANDO IAFRATE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND BIG DATA: THE
BIRTH OF A NEW INTELLIGENCE 48 (2018).
146
Yaniv Taigman et al., DeepFace: Closing the Gap to Human-Level Performance in Face Verification, in 2014 IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER VISION
AND PATTERN RECOGNITION 1701, 1705 (2014).
147
Emily Price, Millions of Flickr Photos Were Scraped to Train Facial
Recognition Software, FORTUNE (Mar. 12, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/03/12/millions-of-flickr-photos-were-scraped-to-train-facialrecognition-software.

928

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:898

Despite these user contributions, managers of technology companies may still argue that their companies have no responsibility to
reciprocate. They may argue that their companies have already made
contributions to users by initiating their platform services or technologies providing users with new experiences. Alternatively, these
managers may contend that their companies fulfill their responsibility to reciprocate by upgrading regularly the quality of their platforms and technologies, thereby improving user experiences.
These arguments unduly downplay user contributions. Most
technology companies are very different from conventional companies that manufacture and sell products such as food and clothing or
offer services such as catering and transportation. Conventional
companies serve passive users who pay to consume products or services rather than engaging in the production of products and the provision of services. Therefore, these companies thrive primarily on
their own efforts.
By contrast, many technology companies thrive both on their
own efforts and the contributions of their users. These active users
play an indispensable role in the growth of these companies, because
they directly or indirectly engage themselves in the development of
online platforms and data-driven technologies. As discussed earlier
in this Section, users actively post, upload, and update content on
social media platforms and provide personal data such as addresses
and preferences that are shared with other online platforms such as
Amazon. Users have also contributed a vast amount of information
and images for the development of technologies such as AI and facial recognition.
Hence, technology companies ought to take seriously their responsibility to reciprocate users’ contributions. No matter how financially successful and politically powerful they are,148 they ought
to appreciate these contributions, carefully considering the extent to
which the content and data contributed by users has played a positive role in their corporate development. Beyond this, they ought to
consider what actions they can take to reciprocate.

148

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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B. The Responsibility to Play Roles Positively
1. ROLE RESPONSIBILITY
While reciprocity-based responsibility is triggered by the positive
deeds of others, role responsibility is ascribed to individuals or institutions if they themselves have spontaneously assumed certain roles
in personal or social activities. As another ethical norm, role responsibility requires individuals to take responsibility for the specific roles
they choose to adopt by themselves. H. L. A. Hart justifies role responsibility as follows:
[a] sea captain is responsible for the safety of his
ship, and that is his responsibility, or one of his responsibilities. A husband is responsible for the
maintenance of his wife; parents for the upbringing
of their children; . . . a clerk for keeping the accounts
of his firm. These examples of a person’s responsibilities suggest the generalization that, whenever a
person occupies a distinctive place or office in a social organization, to which specific duties are attached to provide for the welfare of others or to advance in some specific way the aims or purposes of
the organization, he is properly said to be responsible
for the performance of these duties, or for doing what
is necessary to fulfil them. Such duties are a person’s
responsibilities.149
Responsibility, as the above justification shows, could be imposed on a person based on a specific role he or she plays. An individual occupies a certain official role such as a sea captain, a husband,
or a clerk. These interpersonal roles put the individual in a special
position in relation to others whose interests would be affected, assigning him or her certain functions to perform or goals to fulfill.150

149

H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 212 (2d ed. 2008).
150
See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL
THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 38 (1986) (arguing that “at any given point
in time and within a particular normative scheme, organizational behavior is amenable to analysis and interpretation in terms of the organization’s instrumental
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In this context, expectations are cast upon such an individual to take
responsibilities to perform functions or fulfill goals attached to his or
her role.151
Role responsibility leads to two kinds of responsibilities in practice. First, personal responsibilities are attached to specific roles, such
as husband, wife, father, and mother, on the basis of intimate relationships that form small-scale institutions such as family and marriage.
Second, professional responsibilities arise from the specific roles individuals choose to serve in larger institutions such as companies and
governmental agencies. Once an individual chooses a profession that
confers upon him or her the authority to control people and resources,
certain responsibilities are then imposed on him or her within the
bounds of the profession.152
Compared with personal responsibilities, professional responsibilities trigger accountability toward more people whose interests
may be affected either directly or indirectly. For instance, a sea captain, as Hart points out, is responsible for the safety of the ship for the
sake of its passengers. Following the ethos of role responsibility, the
captain is supposed to exercise due care and take prudent measures
throughout the journey.153 A judge serving on the bench is responsible for the impartial adjudication of a given case.154 Therefore, he or
nature, that is, in terms of its pursuit of some predetermined individual or social
goals”).
151
See Robin Zheng, What is My Role in Changing the System? A New Model
of Responsibility for Structural Injustice, 21 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC.
869, 875 (2018) (“Performing a role . . . is an ongoing process of making infinitely
many tiny decisions about how to perform it, thereby calibrating one’s behavior
with another’s expectations and behavior at the same time that the other is calibrating their expectations and behavior with yours.”) (emphasis in original).
152
See Peter Cane, Role Responsibility, 20 J. ETHICS 279, 285 (2016)
(“[A]person in authority may, in fact, be (or have been) capable of controlling the
people and events complained of; and if the authority should have exercised control, this may provide a basis for imposing personal responsibility on the authority
for what occurred. However, regardless of capacity to control, the authority may
be role-responsible simply by virtue of the authority.”).
153
HART, supra note 149, at 212.
154
See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353, 354 (1978) (“From this office certain requirements might be deduced, for example, that of impartiality, since a judge to be ‘truly’ such must be
impartial. Then, as the next step, if he is to be impartial he must be willing to hear
both sides, etc.”).
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she must to make every effort to fulfill this role responsibility, delivering a properly-reasoned judicial decision for the parties involved.155
Moreover, while personal responsibilities privately serve only the
interests of individuals in intimate relationships, professional responsibilities affect societal interests at large in the short and long term.
For example, if most judges in a country were corrupt, their biased
ruling of, or meddling in, individual cases would ultimately undermine the societal interest of maintaining the rule of law. Similarly, if
environmental regulators failed to take proactive actions to prevent
certain factories from polluting the air or water, this failure would ultimately erode the societal interest of environmental protection. If legislators took bribes from a food company to push for the passage of a
new food law relaxing safety standards, the societal interest of ensuring food safety would be jeopardized. These instances show that social roles require those who hold them to make prudent decisions in
the public interest rather than in favor of any particular person or
group.156
Central to the fulfilment of role responsibility is the ability to engage in ethical deliberation. Hart emphasizes this deliberative function, pointing out that “[a] responsible person is one who is disposed
to take his duties seriously; to think about them, and to make serious
efforts to fulfil them. To behave responsibly is to behave as a man
would who took his duties in this serious way.”157
There are two key steps in conducting this ethical deliberation
with regards to role responsibility.158 First, individuals in specific personal or professional roles must learn to consider the private or societal interests that might be affected by their performance of the role.

155

Id.
See, e.g., JUSTIN OAKLEY & DEAN COCKING, VIRTUE ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL ROLES 118 (2001) (arguing that “if health and justice are taken as
the appropriate ends of the medical and legal professions, respectively, then the
proper roles and dispositions of doctors and lawyers will be determined according
to how well those roles and dispositions serve health or justice, respectively.”).
157
HART, supra note 149, at 213.
158
See Sun, Copyright, supra note 64, at 292–93 (discussing the role of moral
deliberation).
156
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For instance, doctors should be aware of their responsibilities to receive adequate medical ethics education.159 This is because their failure to do so would negatively affect their capacity to tackle medical
problems and protect patients’ interests in health. Second, those individuals must prudently consider how they should perform their personal or professional roles so as to promote the private or societal interests identified in the first step.160 This process normally requires
“care and attention over a protracted period of time.”161 Failure to
meet their role responsibilities would trigger legal liabilities or moral
blame.162
2. TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’ ROLE RESPONSIBILITIES
In this Section, I examine the important professional roles that
technology companies play as information disseminators, collectors, and/or creators. Following the theory of role responsibility, I
argue that their managers should consider how the companies can
play these roles positively.
Technology companies such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter,
and YouTube act as information disseminators by operating social
media platforms.163 These companies help disseminate all variety of
information, including e-commerce data, entertainment updates, and
news.164 Compared with conventional media outlets, social media
platforms have three major advantages in disseminating information.
First, social media platforms allow users to disseminate information with unprecedented ease. As long as users are connected to
See ARISTOTLE, supra note 120, at 3 (pointing out that “the end of [the
medical art] is health”).
160
See, e.g., OAKLEY & COCKING, supra note 156, at 74 (arguing that “a professional role is . . . importantly determined by how well that role functions in
serving the goals of the profession, and by how those goals are connected with
characteristic human activities”).
161
HART, supra note 149, at 213.
162
Id. at 215–22.
163
See, e.g., Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, The Rise of Social Media, OUR WORLD
DATA (Sept. 18, 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/rise-of-social-media (reporting
that Facebook has 2.4 billion users of the 3.5 billion people online).
164
Jenny Force, How Social Media Continues to Affect Society, SYSOMOS
(Aug. 23, 2016), https://sysomos.com/2016/08/23/how-social-media-continuesto-affect-society/.
159
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the Internet, they can upload content to a platform whenever and
wherever they wish.165 Moreover, technology companies equip social media platforms with enhanced communication functionalities
such as private messaging, voice calls, voice messages, and video
calling. These functionalities have made social connection much
more convenient, which in turn accelerates transmission of information.
Second, social media platforms offer unprecedented network effects in disseminating information by significantly amplifying the
number of users who view or use information.166 By increasing the
ease of information access and dissemination and providing their
services for free or at a low charge, social media platforms can build
and expand their user base. Facebook, WeChat, and other platforms
offer an extensive range of interactive functionalities allowing commercial entities to disseminate business information to an entire or
partial network of users.167
Third, social media platforms have also facilitated the democratization of information dissemination. Traditional media outlets require content producers to conform to and gain acceptance from the
established infrastructure. Within the traditional media, one must
become a television anchor or journalist if one wishes to deliver
news. Social media platforms have removed such barriers, allowing
anyone to create content and disseminate it directly to the world.168
By providing a direct communication channel to individuals, social
media platforms have arguably helped humanity capitalize on society’s previously untapped human capital and talent. Naturally, as
talented personalities are discovered, the influence and importance

165

SAM HINTON & LARISSA HJORTH, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL MEDIA 32
(2013).
166
See Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1179,
1195 (2003).
167
See Alex Gray, Here's the Secret to How WeChat Attracts 1 Billion
Monthly Users, WORLD ECON. F. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/03/wechat-now-has-over-1-billion-monthly-users/.
168
See, e.g., Alfred Hermida, Social Journalism: Exploring How Social Media is Shaping Journalism, in THE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL ONLINE JOURNALISM
312 (Eugenia Siapera & Andreas Veglis eds., 2012) (“[D]igital technologies are
empowering more users to participate in more ways in the creation of media.”).
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of the platform they inhabit also grows. To use revenue as an indicator, in 2017, YouTube’s revenue ($7.8 billion)169 was more than
quadruple that of the New York Times ($1.7 billion).170
Technology companies also act as information collectors. They
collect data about consumers through their shopping activities, communications, social media activities, and so on.171 They analyze and
then utilize data sets on consumer locations, behaviors, preferences,
and characteristics in their corporate interests for a variety of purposes. These may range from enhancing security or facilitating the
effective dissemination of advertisements on their platforms to developing technologies such as AI and facial recognition.172 Technology companies may also collect data for sale to other parties, such
as consumer scoring companies or credit rating agencies.
Moreover, technology companies act as information creators by
generating new intellectual properties. In 2019, the top fifty recipients of registered patents were all technology companies. IBM
topped this ranking with 9,262 patent applications approved by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.173 For many researchers, technology companies provide the means to create, operationalize, and
commercialize their inventions. Therefore, they are willing to sign
employee contracts that grant ownership of their employment-related inventions to the company.
Technology companies fare so well as innovative information
creators because they meet the three crucial factors required for innovation: (1) a recognized need, (2) competent people with relevant
technology, and (3) financial support. 174 Technology companies
169

J. Clement, Worldwide Net Advertising Revenues of YouTube from 2016 to
2020 (in Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA (May 7, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/289658/youtube-global-net-advertising-revenues/.
170
New York Times Revenue 2006-2019, MACROTRENDS https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/NYT/new-york-times/revenue (last visited Jan. 20,
2020).
171
Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 38, at 1156
(“Big Data collects and analyzes information about people — their locations, actions, characteristics, and behaviors.”).
172
See supra notes 132–147 and accompanying text.
173
IFI CLAIMS Patent Services, 2019 Top 50 US Patent Assignees,
https://www.ificlaims.com/rankings-top-50-2019.htm (last updated Jan. 8, 2020).
174
See Barishnikova O.E. & Nevzorova M.N., Development of Innovation, 6
EUR. J. NAT. HIST. 53, 53 (2015).
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have departments associated with each factor. The “need” in the
case of technology companies refers to consumer needs, preferences, and desires, and market research personnel in a technology
company are specialized in discovering these unmet needs of the
market. The research and development department is made up of
people familiar with existing relevant technologies who are able to
create new technologies according to specifications discovered by
the market research team. Financial support for the project is secured by the finance department.
Pursuant to the ethos of role responsibility, technology companies should play their professional roles as information disseminators, collectors, and creators positively. First, they should adequately
consider how these roles would affect their users’ private interests,
as well as societal interests. Second, they should take actions that
are reasonably necessary to protect these interests. Failure to do either should subject them to legal penalties or moral blame.
Akin to the information fiduciary approach suggested by Professor Jack Balkin,175 the ethos of role responsibility supports the imposition of fiduciary duties upon technology company managers.
Acting as information collectors, they should have a fiduciary duty
to protect their users’ private interests in personal data. Both approaches require managers of technology companies to take action
to fulfill these duties of their own volition and based upon their ethical deliberation. As Professor Jonathan Zittrain observes, the information fiduciary approach “protects consumers and corrects a clear
market failure without the need for heavy-handed government intervention.”176 The role responsibility approach, however, draws on a
different ethical theory and could address two theoretical and practical problems with the information fiduciary approach.
First, the information fiduciary approach does not tackle the potential conflict between managers’ duty to protect users’ interests in

175

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
Jonathan Zittrain, How to Exercise the Power You Didn’t Ask For, HARV.
BUS. REV.: BIG IDEA (Sept. 19, 2018), https:// hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercisethe-power-you-didnt-ask-for.
176
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personal data and their duty to maximize their shareholders’ interests.177 Such conflicts abound in reality. Technology companies’ fiduciary duty to use personal data with due care conflicts with their
motive to further their corporate interests in earning profits by hosting advertisements or selling data sets to other parties. How can the
information fiduciary approach win the hearts and minds of managers hired to serve shareholders’ interests?
The role responsibility approach has the potential to address this
problem by integrating role responsibility into the corporate decision-making process. It reimagines technology companies as social
enterprises that prioritize serving their users’ private interests and
societal interests at large while promoting their shareholders’ interests as a secondary consideration. This approach still allows managers of technology companies to pursue the maximization of shareholder value, so long as it does not conflict with the company’s priorities in serving users’ private interests and those of society. From
this perspective, role responsibility requires managers to adequately
consider how their corporate operations would affect these interests
as part of their initial decision-making process.178 Moreover, technology companies’ responsibility to reciprocate users’ contributions
reinforces this role responsibility, because it also requires managers
to take action to protect users’ interests.
Second, the information fiduciary approach only deals with
technology companies’ role as information collectors, not as information disseminators and creators. The protection of personal data
is indeed crucially important, given the prevalence of data breaches.
However, as this Section has shown, the roles of information disseminators and creators are also of crucial importance to individual
users and society at large. They affect the flow of information, reg-

177
See Khan & Pozen, supra note 40, at 506 (suggesting that the information
fiduciary approach “would also pose a threat to Facebook’s bottom line and therefore to the interest of shareholders”).
178
See Erika George, Corporate Social Responsibility and Social Media Corporations: Incorporating Human Rights Through Rankings, Self-Regulation and
Shareholder Resolutions, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 521, 524 (2018) (“Given
the power and influence of private corporations to create platforms used by members of the public who share news, ideas, and often even personal information, it
is important to better understand the ways in which human rights issues implicated
by the policies and practices of social media companies.”).
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ulation of speech, and innovation. In contrast to the information fiduciary approach, role responsibility does not single out the information collector role. Rather, it integrates the three roles and shapes
them as the functions that technology companies must serve as social enterprises. It then requires technology companies to take
broader strategies to fulfill their responsibilities arising from these
three roles. Under this approach, if a technology company takes its
information disseminator and creator roles seriously and fulfills its
corresponding responsibilities well, it should put itself in a very
good position to perform its information collector role while protecting personal data.
C. The Responsibility to Confront Injustices Created by
Technological Development
1. SOCIAL JUSTICE
All human beings are equal in dignity and freedom, and this status is legally recognized in both international human rights treaties
and national constitutions.179 However, injustice is a part of every
society. The unjust distribution of social resources that leads to income disparities continues to get worse.180 Status injustices caused
by racial, gender, and sexuality discrimination still exist in the
United States and in many other countries.
Against this backdrop, social justice is widely regarded as a fundamental value intended to minimize the impact of unequal distribution of resources and status discrimination. For example, leading
179

For example, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
states that, “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a
spirit of brotherhood.” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948).
180
See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
430–32 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014) (surveying the growing inequality in
distribution of resources); Ilyana Kuziemko & Stefanie Stantcheva, Our Feelings
About Inequality: It’s Complicated N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Apr. 21, 2013,
8:45 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/our-feelings-aboutinequality-its-complicated/ (“Since the 1970s, income inequality in the United
States has increased at a historic rate. In 1970, the richest 1 percent of Americans
enjoyed 9 percent of total national pre-tax income. In 2011, by contrast, that share
had risen to 19.8 percent.”).

938

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:898

philosopher John Rawls has elevated social justice to the status of
the “first virtue of social institutions.”181
Social justice, by nature, centers on how to allocate responsibilities for distributing resources and social statuses. From this perspective, Rawls captures the essence of a responsibility-based notion of social justice as follows:
[t]his conception [of social justice] includes what we
may call a social division of responsibility: society,
the citizens as a collective body, accepts the responsibility for maintaining the equal basic liberties and
fair equality of opportunity, and for providing a fair
share of the other primary goods for everyone within
this framework, while citizens (as individuals) and
associations accept the responsibility for revising
and adjusting their ends and aspirations in view of
the all-purpose means they can expect, given their
present and foreseeable situation.182
This statement shows that central to social justice is the distribution of responsibilities among citizens. Thus, Rawls further argues
that “the principles of social justice . . . provide a way of assigning
rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define
the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.”183
The responsibility to promote social justice, in my opinion, involves tackling three forms of injustice: privatization-driven injustice, technology-driven injustice, and identity-driven injustice. The
third form of injustice typically classifies people on the basis of race,
gender, and/or sexuality, causing discriminatory harm to them. In
the discussion that follows, I discuss only the first two forms of injustice.
181

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999)
[hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE]. Rawls also points out that “[a] theory
however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust.” Id.
182
JOHN RAWLS, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in COLLECTED PAPERS
359, 371 (Samuel Freeman ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (emphasis added).
183
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 181, at 4.
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The responsibility to counter privatization-driven injustice
arises because it causes structural maldistribution of social resources.184 Although the free market allows voluntary transactions
of private property, it is still fraught with injustice due to the coercive power embedded in larger social structures.185 Unequal distribution of private property is a fundamental source of coercive power
in the marketplace. This power is not defensive, but offensive. It is
not a means of shielding the property owner from unwarranted interference from others or the state, but the legal basis for coercing
others to do things that the property owner wishes.186
Thus, the free market is by no means free of coercion. Rather,
property-based coercive power is arguably intrinsic in the marketplace. From this perspective, effective distributional policies should
require an analysis of how the legal system allocates coercive
power. For instance, the rationale against expansive privatization of
natural resources by and large stems from the fact that the free market, despite its liberty-promoting function, results in coercion by
creating monopolization of resources.187 In a modern society, it is
inevitable that every person is involved in the trade that takes place
in the marketplace. While every person has an equal nominal status
as a trading participant, the type or amount of resources that he or
she controls in fact differs from one person to another. Therefore,
bargaining power when negotiating deals in the marketplace always
varies from person to person, making it possible that people with
stronger bargaining power can coerce others into following their
commands.188
184

See IRIS MARION YOUNG, RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE 45 (2011).
See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923).
186
Id. at 472.
187
See, e.g., David Brodwin, The Tragedy of Privatizing the Commons: Why
Privatizing Our Shared Resources Doesn’t Work., U.S. NEWS (Mar. 2, 2015, 1:35
PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/03/02/privatization-not-the-answer-for-saving-the-commons (“The concentration of rights
creates an arms race that attracts capital and new technology to extract in ways
that are ever more efficient (that’s a good thing), but which are also ever more
destructive to the future productivity of the commons . . . . Given our pay-to-play
politics, once rights get concentrated, it’s all too easy for the new owners to hijack
the regulatory and legislative process.”).
188
See, e.g., Hale, supra note 185, at 472.
185
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The responsibility to counter technology-driven injustice is critically important because of the pervasiveness of technology in contemporary society. Technological advancement in recent decades
has offered solutions to many of humanity’s problems. However, it
causes increasing inequality, primarily in the following two ways.
First, access to the benefits of technological development is becoming increasingly unequal. A recent United Nations report reveals that more than half the world’s population lacks access to the
Internet and its advantages.189 In the United States, access to technology is a determining factor in the knowledge divide between rich
and poor youth.190 Unequal access to technology has magnified preexisting social problems and widened the divide between rich and
poor.191
Second, technology affects the distribution of social resources,
especially in the labor market. Theoretically, all rational individuals,
upon being replaced by automation, would simply acquire new skillsets to make themselves employable again in the labor market.192
This is not observed in reality, however. Statistics show that significant proportions of workers displaced due to technological developments are simply not able to find new jobs.193 The apparent winners capturing the economic benefits of technological innovation are
the managers and owners of technology companies and other entities that apply productivity-boosting technologies.194 Wealth ends
189
Ray Downs, UN: Majority of World’s Population Lacks Internet Access,
UPI (Sep. 18, 2017, 9:06 PM), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/WorldNews/2017/09/18/UN-Majority-of-worlds-population-lacks-internetaccess/6571505782626/.
190
Meghan Murphy, Technology as a Basic Need: The Impact of the Access
Gap in Poverty, 1776 (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.1776.vc/insights/technologyas-a-basic-need-the-impact-of-the-access-gap-in-poverty.
191
See, e.g., Daniele Selby, Millions of Students in the US Lack Access to
Technology and High-Speed Internet, GLOBAL CITIZEN (Sept. 14, 2018),
https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/verizon-innovative-learning-tech-program/.
192
How Will Automation Affect Jobs, Skills, and Wages?, MCKINSEY & CO.,
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/how-will-automation-affect-jobs-skills-and-wages (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
193
See ANDREW YANG, THE WAR ON NORMAL PEOPLE: THE TRUTH ABOUT
AMERICA’S DISAPPEARING JOBS AND WHY UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME IS OUR
FUTURE xiii (2018).
194
Estlund, supra note 27, at 287.
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up concentrated in the hands of these individuals through technology’s replacement of labor force. 195 This exacerbates existing
wealth inequality, making a small minority richer and the poor even
more impoverished.
A poignant example of the relationship between technology and
injustice can be found in Silicon Valley, where the contrast between
the immense amount of wealth accumulated by tech giants with possibly the largest camp of homeless people in the United States just
twenty minutes away shows that booms no longer lift all boats.196
Increased efficiency, productivity, and economic gains from technological advancement are not enjoyed by all. Instead, the high
wages enjoyed by those employed in the technology industry have
driven up the cost of living while wealth in the region is not proportionally redistributed into the community.197
2. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES
Based upon the preceding Section, I argue that technology companies have a fundamental responsibility to confront injustices created by technological development. This responsibility should legally and ethically motivate them to counter both privatizationdriven and technology-driven injustices.
With respect to their responsibility to counter privatizationdriven injustice, technology companies have to deal with the conflict
between their intellectual property rights and the public’s enjoyment
of the benefits of technological progress.198 Given that technology
195
David Rotman, Technology and Inequality, MIT TECH. REV., Nov.–Dec.
2014, at 52, 56 (“As machines increasingly substitute for labor and building a
business becomes less capital-intensive—you don’t need a printing plant to produce an online news site, or large investments to create an app—the biggest economic winners will not be those owning conventional capital but, instead, those
with the ideas behind innovative new products and successful business models.”).
196
Id. at 54; Robert Johnson, Welcome to ‘The Jungle’: The Largest Homeless
Camp in Mainland USA Is Right in the Heart of Silicon Valley, BUS. INSIDER
(Sept. 7, 2013, 10:52 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-jungle-largesthomeless-camp-in-us-2013-8; Alexia Fernández Campbell et al., How Silicon
Valley Created America’s Largest Homeless Camp, ATLANTIC (Nov. 25, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/11/how-silicon-valley-created-americas-largest-homeless-camp/431739.
197
See Campbell et al., supra note 196.
198
See LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 234–37 (2011).
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companies can significantly affect the distribution and enjoyment of
these benefits, the Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications highlights the responsibility of corporations:
the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress
and its applications may create tensions with the intellectual property regime, which is a temporary monopoly with a valuable social function that should be
managed in accordance with a common responsibility to prevent the unacceptable prioritization of profit
for some over benefit for all.199
As information creators, technology companies have exercised
their intellectual property rights irresponsibly, causing privatizationbased injustice. The irresponsible exercise of copyright, for example, has significantly increased the cost for the public of taking advantage of technologies to access and use copyrighted works. First,
the copyright-based industry is making every effort to lobby the legislature to adopt laws that provide increasingly stringent protection
of copyright. 200 As a result, the legal protection of technological
measures has entitled copyright holders to lock up information, copyright terms have been retroactively extended to place more works
under proprietary control, and databases have been afforded
stronger legal protection to fence off public access.201 At the same
199
UNESCO, THE RIGHT TO ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
AND ITS APPLICATIONS 15 (2019), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/

pf0000185558; see also Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights), Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights:
The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications, ¶ 65,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/26 (May 14, 2012), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-26_en.pdf
(pointing out that “legal scholars have increasingly questioned the economic effectiveness of intellectual property regimes in promoting scientific and cultural
innovation. Scholars have found no evidence to support the assumption that scientific creativity is only galvanized by legal protection or that the short-term costs
of limiting dissemination are lower than the long-term gain of additional incentives”).
200
See Louis Menand, Crooner in Rights Spat: Are Copyright Laws Too
Strict?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/20/crooner-rights-spat.
201
See Sun, Copyright, supra note 64, at 272–78.
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time, the recent expansion of copyright protection has severely jeopardized the public interest accommodations in copyright law and
significantly narrowed copyright limitations.202
Second, fueled by the expansion of copyright protection, many
copyright holders have in turn exercised their rights irresponsibly.203
As the commercial value of copyrights has grown, corporations have
taken possession of copyrights over a rapidly increasing number of
works.204 Most corporations are profit-maximizing entities and are
thus inclined to resort to aggressive copyright protection strategies.
For example, the scope of copyright rights are routinely exaggerated
to prevent members of the public from using copyrighted works in
ways that the fair use doctrine would permit. 205 Many copyright
owners “only speak in terms of the advantage of property rights, and
never the burdens that necessarily go with property ownership.”206
Oftentimes, irresponsible exercise of intellectual property rights
causes serious harm to the public interest in knowledge creation and
diffusion. The marketing practice adopted by Elsevier, the world’s
largest academic publisher, is a case in point. Despite the fact it has
earned profit margins higher than top technology companies including Apple, Google, and Amazon, 207 Elsevier charges exorbitantly
202

Id. at 279.
Id. at 269–78.
204
At present, copyrights are largely concentrated in the hand of big media,
including copyright-based entertainment, publishing, communications, and software industries. Id. at 273. In the publishing, entertainment, and software industries, the prevailing business practice is to require individual creators of works to
let their employers own their creations on the basis of the work-for-hire doctrine.
See Neil J. Rosini, What’s a ‘Work for Hire’ and Why Should You Care?, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Whats-a-Workfor-Hire-and/150333. Many individual creators of works have to transfer ownership of their works to corporations through contractual arrangements that are
semi-compulsory. See Orly Lobel, Opinion, My Ideas, My Boss’s Property, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/14/opinion/my-ideasmy-bosss-property.html. This is, in part, because individual creators who need
corporations to merchandize their works.
205
See JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 12 (2011).
206
WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 123 (2009).
207
Stephen Buranyi, Is the Staggeringly Profitable Business of Scientific Publishing Bad for Science?, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/jun/27/profitable-business-scientific-publishing-bad-forscience (“In 2010, Elsevier’s scientific publishing arm reported profits of £724m
203
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high prices for subscriptions to individual journals and the purchase
of individual articles. A top mathematics journal published by
Princeton University Press charges $0.13 per page. In sharp contrast,
the top ten Elsevier journals cost $1.30 per page or more.208 Many
prominent universities and academics have already come into conflict with Elsevier for its unreasonably high subscription fees.209 Negotiations between the University of California (“UC”) and Elsevier
for a new journal subscription contract broke down after UC’s subscription expired in December 2018210 and approximately 350,000
UC researchers and students’ access to Elsevier’s journal articles
was cut off.211
Moreover, technology companies have a responsibility to deal
with technology-driven injustice. While rapid technological advancement has offered remarkable benefits for humanity, it has also
created new problems of social injustice. Against this backdrop,
technology companies should explore the extent to which the new
technologies they develop would negatively affect societal interests
at large and group interests in particular, and then take their own
actions to tackle these problems or support related governmental
measures.
First, technology companies should consider how, for example,
their newly developed technologies would negatively affect equality

on just over £2bn in revenue. It was a 36% margin – higher than Apple, Google,
or Amazon posted that year.”).
208
The Cost of Knowledge, http://gowers.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/elsevierstatementfinal.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
209
See, e.g., Sarah Zhang, The Real Cost of Knowledge, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/03/uc-elsevier-publisher/583909.
210
Gretchen Kell, Why UC Split with Publishing Giant Elsevier, U.C. (Mar.
6, 2019), https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/why-uc-split-publishinggiant-elsevier.
211
Diana Kwon, University of California Loses Access to New Content in
Elsevier Journals, SCIENTIST (July 12, 2019), https://www.the-scientist.com/news-opinion/university-of-california-loses-access-to-new-content-inelsevier-journals-66149.
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of job market. Technologies such as automation and AI are transforming labor markets and gradually resulting in job losses.212 Jobs
replaced are typically middle-class jobs that require repetitive and
predictable work,213 such as administrative, clerical, or production
positions. 214 This change in socioeconomic class composition increases the wealth disparity between the rich and the poor.215 This
additionally creates a higher supply of available low-skill, low-paying labor, and thereby depresses the wages of these positions, further
increasing income and wealth inequality.216 Increased productivity
resulting from technology means, for instance, that a firm once requiring five accountants now only needs three to manage the same
workload. As AI and automation-related technologies improve, the
same firm may only require one accountant or no accountants at
all.217 Increased productivity may ultimately result in a hypercompetitive labor market with increased stakes bringing it closer, if not
completely, to a winner-takes-all situation.218
Second, technology companies should consider how the design
of their newly developed technologies would negatively impact
group interests. Those who are marginalized or possess less wealth
typically are not the primary target group of companies providing
new technology-based products, because these groups typically lack
sufficient buying power.219 Given that these people are outside companies’ target consumer group, they are ignored in the design of new

212
OXFORD ECON., HOW ROBOTS CHANGE THE WORLD: WHAT AUTOMATION
REALLY MEANS FOR JOBS AND PRODUCTIVITY 19–21 (2019), https://www.automation.com/pdf_articles/oxford/RiseOfTheRobotsFinal240619_Digital.pdf;
Estlund, supra note 27, at 269 (2018).
213
OXFORD ECON., supra note 212, at 23.
214
Rotman, supra note 195, at 56–58.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
See, e.g., Jay Wacker, How Much Will AI Decrease the Need For Human
Labor?, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2017, 1:16 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/
2017/01/18/how-much-will-ai-decrease-the-need-for-human-labor/#1ab19fb575
c0.
218
Estlund, supra note 27, at 280.
219
For example, an increasing number of software and mobile apps require
uninterrupted Internet connection to function. See List of Technology Design Decisions That Marginalize People, GEEK FEMINISM WIKI, https://geekfeminism.wikia.org/wiki/List_of_technology_design_decisions_that_marginal-
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technologies, further marginalizing them and limiting their access to
certain technologies.220 Even well-meaning initiatives can unintentionally exclude marginalized groups. For example, when assisting
a government project to increase accessibility of a public service by
transferring that service online so that “anyone” can access it “at any
time,” a technology company should examine in advance how particular groups of people would be affected. Without such scrutiny,
this upgrade could unintentionally disadvantage those who are illiterate or visually impaired, among others, making a service that was
once accessible to them inaccessible.
D. Summary
The three corporate fundamental responsibilities, as I have put
forward, form a matrix of legal and ethical guidance for the benevolent behavior of technology companies. First, the responsibility to
reciprocate users’ contributions is the base of this matrix, urging
technology companies to take immediate action to appreciate and
return those contributions by protecting those users’ private data effectively. Second, the responsibility to perform their role positively
constitutes the pillars of the matrix, encouraging corporate managers’ ethical deliberations about how their companies could fulfill responsibilities in accordance with their three professional roles.
Third, the responsibility to confront injustices created by technological development acts as the beacon of light flashing on the top of
the matrix. 221 It is the highest responsibility that technology companies should aspire to assume after they have fulfilled the first two
responsibilities.
The ethical theories of reciprocity, role responsibility, and social
justice have been conventionally utilized to justify personal respon-

ize_people (last visited Jan. 26, 2020). This is technologically and financially infeasible in poor countries in which the information technology and communication infrastructure is significantly inadequate and the cost of Internet connection
is beyond the affordability of the general public. Id.
220
See id.
221
Professor Purdy regards the responsibility for social justice as the highest
aspiration because it requires “embracing both our creative ethical capacity and
our sense of responsibility to make sense of and do justice, in every sense of that
word” to society at large. Jedediah Purdy, Our Place in the World: A New Relationship for Environmental Ethics and Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 857, 932 (2013).
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sibilities. Here, I have applied them to justify corporate responsibilities, because the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil teaches that
persons who control a company should be held responsible for any
wrongdoing committed in their company’s name.222
Piercing the veil of technology companies, it is their managers
and shareholders who should bear these three fundamental responsibilities. To fulfill them, they must learn how to manage the relationship between their institution and society. From this perspective,
it is an ethical educational process in which those managers and
shareholders learn how to become responsible members of a technological society.223
III.

ENFORCING CORPORATE FUNDAMENTAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
In this Part, I explore how the law should enforce the three corporate fundamental responsibilities through specific legal responsibilities requiring technology companies to protect personal data effectively and exercise their intellectual property rights properly.
A. The Responsibility to Protect Personal Data Effectively
1. NEW RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DATA PROTECTION
Given the risk of privacy breaches caused by digital technologies, consumers now care more about protection of their personal
data than ever before. This protection is of fundamental importance
to the freedom and dignity of each individual. Unauthorized collection or disclosure of data such as home or email address, identification card number, banking information, and medical records may
infringe an individual’s right to privacy and create serious emotional
222
See, e.g., Broward Marine, Inc. v. S/V Zeus, No. 05-23105, 2010 WL
427496, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2010) (deciding to pierce the corporate veil and
finding that the company’s dominant shareholder should be personally liable for
the torts of his company); Ocala Breeders’ Sales Co. v. Hialeah, Inc., 735 So. 2d
542, 543–44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (piercing the corporate veil to pursue the
personal liability of corporate officers).
223
As Hannah Arendt reminds us, “men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit
the world.” HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 7 (2d ed. 1998). No human
being lives alone in the world. Rather, human beings live together in a common
world, from birth to death.
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distress or financial harm. Widespread collection of big data has exacerbated the problem. The secretive collection of big data has become normalized in the digital world, making all consumers very
vulnerable.
The protection of personal data frequently triggers cross-jurisdictional issues as technology companies face different legal standards across the globe.224 For example, the U.S. protection regime is
grounded in consumer protection, encouraging fairness of exchange
of private data. By contrast, the E.U. framework adopts a rightsbased approach to data protection by recognizing and protecting the
fundamental right to privacy.225
Against this backdrop, I argue that technology companies should
treat private data protection as a core part of their fundamental responsibilities. First, this is required by technology companies’ fundamental responsibility to reciprocate their users’ contributions.
Having collected personal data from their users, technology companies should appreciate users’ contributions to their data reservoir
and make every effort to protect this data effectively.
Second, role responsibility requires that technology companies
play their professional role as data collectors well. This role gives
them the authority to control personal data, which is one of the
world’s most valuable resources.226 Their role responsibility then requires them to closely examine the fact that their collection and fur-

224
Robert Levine, Behind the European Privacy Ruling That’s Confounding
Silicon
Valley,
N.Y. TIMES
(Oct.
9,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/business/international/behind-the-european-privacy-ruling-thats-confounding-silicon-valley.html (“International data transfers are the
lifeblood of the digital economy.”).
225
See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1157 (2004) (pointing out that “it has
become common for Europeans to maintain that they respect a ‘fundamental right
to privacy’ that is either weak or wholly absent in the ‘cultural context’ of the
United States”); Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 78, at 121 (finding that “the EU
system protects the individual by granting her fundamental rights pertaining to
data protection” and that “U.S. law protects the individual as a privacy consumer”).
226
The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data,
ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/theworlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data.
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ther utilization of personal data may affect their users’ private interests in dignity227 as well as the larger societal interests in data security.228 Moreover, technology companies should consider how they
can exercise their authority in utilizing personal data in ways that
adequately protect users’ private interests and societal interests as
well.
To legally fulfill these two responsibilities, I propose that technology companies should adopt the fundamental principles for data
protection under the GDPR,229 which took effect in the European
Union in May 2018.230 The GDPR sets the world’s highest standards
for protecting E.U. residents’ right to personal data and enforcing
data collectors’ duties.231 It is applicable to any company that processes E.U. residents’ personal data. This proposal would require
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding
function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 957,1008 (1989) (concluding that privacy protection rules “enable individuals to receive and to express respect, and to that extent are constitutive of human
dignity”); Whitman, supra note 225, at 1161 (“Continental privacy protections
are, at their core, a form of protection of a right to respect and personal dignity.”).
228
See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1914
(2013) (using electronic voting as an example to show the importance of data security); Anupam Chander et al., Catalyzing Privacy Law 29 (Univ. Colo. Law
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19-25, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3433922 (“Over the last year, the United States has seen an
unprecedented volume of legislative proposals regulating data privacy at the state
level. This burst of interest has manifested in multiple types of laws: on data security, on internet service provider (ISP) privacy, on specific types of data, and
on comprehensive data privacy.”).
229
GDPR, supra note 35.
230
The General Data Protection Regulation Applies in All Member States
from 25 May 2018, EUR-LEX (May 24, 2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/content/news/general-data-protection-regulation-GDPR-applies-from-25-May2018.html.
231
It is this stringency, comprehensiveness of data privacy protection, and
flexibility that make the GDPR the global gold standard for protecting the privacy
and rights of data subjects. Lydia de la Torre, GDPR Matchup: The California
Consumer Privacy Act 2018, IAPP (July 31, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdprmatchup-california-consumer-privacy-act/ (“Most data protection professionals
would agree that the GDPR sets the global ‘gold-standard’ for data protection and
has forced companies across the globe to significantly update their data practices
and ramp up their compliance programs.”). The GDPR provides a harmonizing
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technology companies to operate a two-tiered private data protection
mechanism.
First, technology companies should comply with the GDPR in
good faith if they collect private data belonging to those residing in
the European Union. In that context, they are legally subject to regulation by the GDPR given its mandate of extraterritorial application. 232 When E.U. residents use Amazon, Facebook, WhatsApp,
and Apple Pay, the relevant U.S. technology companies process
their personal data. If these companies make every effort to follow
the GDPR to enhance data protection, they would prove their commitment to treating their E.U. users’ right to privacy seriously. In
demonstrating their ability to comply with the stringent data protection standards of the GDPR, they would further convince the international community that they are truly devoted to safeguarding the
security of personal data.
Second, technology companies should consider adopting the
GDPR as their internal privacy compliance guidelines. Although the
GDPR is not legally applicable to technology companies collecting
private data from those residing outside the European Union, these
companies could still regard the GDPR as a model law for improving their protection of private data, proactively ensuring that their
data protection measures live up to the GDPR’s principles. 233 As
they expand their businesses across the globe, technology companies need to tackle data protection in each country or region in which
they process data. Data privacy laws vary significantly among countries, and some have none. No international treaties have been
adopted to govern data protection globally. In the face of such legal
complexities, technology companies’ adoption of the GDPR as their
internal guidelines would ensure that their products or services are
force for data privacy protection legislation globally. Id. This force stems both
from being the gold standard for data privacy protection and the GDPR’s influence through the requirements it places on receiving parties of data transfers originating from the European Union. Id.
232
GDPR, supra note 35, art. 3(2) (prescribing that the GDPR “applies to the
processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller
or processor not established in the Union”).
233
See Chander et al., supra note 228 at 20–21 (“The GDPR quintessentially
targets compliance from an organizational perspective: it attempts to build up a
particular kind of responsible corporate infrastructure, including internal positions
and processes”).
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fully compliant with the highest of data protection standards. This
strategy would send the message to consumers around the world that
they take personal data protection seriously and believe that everyone deserves the same high level of personal data protection.234
2. GDPR’S CORE PRINCIPLES
In this Section, I discuss the core principles that technology
companies must comply with under the GDPR. As commentators
have observed,235 these principles have been adopted by the California Consumer Privacy Act.236 Guided by these principle, the operation of a two-tiered mechanism would put technology companies in
a better position to keep their data protection measures in full compliance with new regulatory regimes.237
a. Proactive Protection
The idea of privacy by design was incorporated into the GDPR’s
predecessor legislation, the Data Protection Directive, and required
technical measures to be designed and built into data processing system to protect data safety.238 The European Union takes a proactive
approach towards personal data protection aimed at preventing data
breaches and the resulting harms. 239 By integrating protective
measures into the system, personal data protection is positioned at
the core of the data system itself, as opposed to being a patchwork

234
See Bryan Casey et al., Rethinking Explainable Machines: The GDPR’s
“Right to Explanation” Debate and the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in Enterprise,
34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 143, 187 (2019) (discussing the public relations benefits
of following the GDPR).
235
See Chander et al., supra note 228, at 14–18.
236
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (West 2018).
237
See Stuart D. Levi, California Privacy Law: What Companies Should Do
to Prepare in 2019, SKADDEN (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/01/2019-insights/california-privacy-law
(concluding
that “companies that have become GDPR-compliant may have an approach to
data protection that will be useful in adapting to the CCPA’s requirements”).
238
GDPR: Privacy by Design, INTERSOFT CONSULTING, https://gdprinfo.eu/issues/privacy-by-design (last visited Jan. 26, 2020).
239
See, e.g., Data Protection by Design and Default, INFO. COMMISSIONER’S
OFF., https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-thegeneral-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/dataprotection-by-design-and-default (last visited Jan. 26, 2020).

952

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:898

modification that is added later. This integration purportedly improves adherence to data protection measures, resulting in a more
secure system that better protects data and data subjects.240
The specific form of technological protection is not specified
within the GDPR, but context dictates the level of protective
measures required to be built into the data system.241 Factors such
as the scope and amount of data processing, the nature of the data
processed, and the risks posed to rights and freedoms by processing
determine the ultimate level of safeguards that must be implemented. 242 In certain instances, measures such as pseudonymization, encryption, or anonymization can each by themselves satisfy
the requirement of privacy by design. In other situations, commensurate with the higher data privacy stakes involved, a higher standard of protection consisting of a combination of methods would be
required. Data protection rules, such as data minimization, should
also be implemented through design and built into the data system.243
b. User-Centric Protection
Consent and contract are two ways in which data subjects (or
users) can allow the processing of their personal data as an exception
to the general prohibition on data processing.244 These two rules, arguably, empower data subjects to decide for themselves which data
controllers to interact with and what extent of data processing is acceptable.

240

GDPR: Privacy by Design, supra note 238. But see Supreeth Shastri et al.,
The Seven Sins of Personal-Data Processing Systems Under GDPR, USENIX
Ass’n, https://www.usenix.org/system/files/hotcloud19-paper-shastri.pdf (last
visited Jan. 26, 2020) (arguing that some GDPR regulations conflict with the design, architecture, and operation of modern computing systems).
241
See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 35, recital 78, art. 25.
242
Id. art. 25.
243
Id. art. 5(1)(c). For discussion of the principle of data minimization see
Filippo A. Raso, Note, Innovating in Uncertainty: Effective Compliance and the
GDPR, HARV. J.L. & TECH. DIG., Aug. 14, 2018, at 5–6, https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/innovating-in-uncertainty-effective- compliance-and-the-gdpr;
Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL
L. REV. 995, 1009–11 (2017).
244
Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 78, at 142.
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Consequently, the requirements for a valid legal consent to use
one’s private data detailed in the GDPR set a high standard, thus
protecting the interests of the data subject. Under the GDPR, consent
must be (1) freely given, (2) specific, (3) informed, and (4) unambiguous.245 Although there is no specified form required for consent,
consent given by the data subject must be a clear affirmative act or
statement to satisfy the unambiguity requirement.246 Consent cannot
be implied and must always be opt-in as opposed to opt-out.247 Requiring opt-in consent is again consistent with the fundamental starting position in the European Union, where data processing is prohibited by default and there must be some reason to justify processing. Accordingly, the default position cannot be that consent is
given unless the user opts out.
If the data controller relies on consent as the legal basis for data
processing, the data controller is not allowed to switch the legal basis from consent to another basis even if this other valid basis has
always existed.248 In other words, if the data controller decides to
use consent as its legal basis and consent is withdrawn, the controller
cannot continue to process the data by relying on a different legal
basis, even if such a basis is legitimate and existed from the beginning.
c. Transparent Protection
The GDPR aims to maintain the transparency of data protection
through protecting the right of access, which allows data subjects to
review what personal data is possessed by the controller and how
this data is being used.249 By enshrining this right, the GDPR em-

245

GDPR, supra note 35, art. 4(11).
Id. recital 32.
247
What
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Valid
Consent?,
INFO.
COMMISSIONER’S
OFF.,
https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/consent/what-is-valid-consent (last visited
Jan. 26, 2020); Claire Laybats & John Davies, GDPR: Implementing the Regulations, 35 BUS. INFO. REV. 81, 81 (2018); Samuel Greengard, Weighing the Impact
of GDPR, COMM. ACM, Nov. 2018, at 16, 16 (“GDPR takes this concept to a new
and previously untested level.”).
248
GDPR: Consent, INTERSOFT CONSULTING, https://gdpr-info.eu/issues/consent/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2020).
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GDPR, supra note 35, art. 15.
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powers the data subject to obtain information about their data interests. Access to this type of information is integral for the subject to
exercise their other rights. For example, a data subject would not be
able to exercise their right of erasure of personal data if they do not
know that their data is under possession and use in the first place.
Upon request from a data subject, the controller is required to conduct a check.250
To protect a right of access, the GDPR requires that a comprehensive account of data processing and a copy of personal data must
be provided free of charge, either in writing, electronically, or verbally, depending on circumstances.251 There is a “without undue delay” requirement for the provision of this information to the subject,
meaning it must be provided at most within one month barring exceptional circumstances.252 A data controller can only charge a fee
if additional copies of the information are requested, and then the
fee must reflect administrative costs and cannot be a profit-earning
amount.253 The controller may require a more specified request from
the subject that narrows down the data in question if the controller
processes a large volume of information about the subject,254 and
may refuse a request if it is unjustified or excessive.255
d. Professional Protection
The GDPR requires firms to employ a Data Protection Officer
(“DPO”) to oversee and manage the compliance of controllers who
frequently process data.256 This requirement to employ a DPO is not
based on the size of the firm, but on its core activities.257 If a firm’s
operations involve extensive processing of sensitive personal data,
the GDPR requires that firm to employ a DPO.258 The GDPR holds
public bodies to a higher standard, however, and requires them all
to employ DPOs.259
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259

Id.
Id. art. 12.
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Id. art. 37(1)(a).

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

955

The DPO ensures compliance with the GDPR and must be
knowledgeable in the fields of data protection and practices to an
extent commensurate with the scale and complexity of the data processing conducted by the firm.260 He or she acts as the liaison for
data privacy and protection matters with supervisory authorities,
employees, and data subjects.261 A DPO can be an internal employee
or an external specialist but must not have any conflicts of interest
arising from supervision of their own work done in a different capacity.262 In addition to ensuring compliance with all data protection
laws, the DPO is responsible for tasks including assessing data protection impact, increasing employee awareness of data protection
and conducting employee training, and collaborating with supervisory authorities.263
B. The Responsibility to Exercise Intellectual Property Rights
Properly
Intellectual property is supremely important in the economic and
cultural development of modern society. It regulates the ways in
which creativity and innovation are protected and disseminated with
technologies, whether print or digital.264
In this Section, I argue that technology companies should exercise their intellectual property rights responsibly so as to confront
injustices caused by technological development. Courts should take
this responsibility into consideration when they decide on intellectual property cases that may have significant impact on social justice. As Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm shows, a crucial

260

Id. art. 37(5).
Id. art. 38(4), 39(1).
262
Data Protection Officer (DPO), EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION
SUPERVISOR, https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection/reference-library/data-protection-officer-dpo_en (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).
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GDPR, supra note 35, art. 39(1).
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See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS
OF THE MIND 7 (2008) (“Copyright law is supposed to give us a self-regulating
cultural policy in which the right to exclude others from one’s original expression
fuels a vibrant public sphere indirectly driven relationship by popular demand.”);
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1535, 1537 (2005) (“Copyright law generally addresses the relationship between
creative expression and money in terms of maximizing total creativity.”).
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step courts could take is to curb the expansive patent rights of technology companies by requiring them to license their essential standard patents in fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”)
terms.265
1. Federal Trade Commission V. QUALCOMM
The FTC sued Qualcomm before the District Court for the
Northern District of California. The FTC alleged that Qualcomm’s
anticompetitive behavior relating to its patent licensing practices violated § 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits “[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce.”266 Qualcomm is the industry
leader for modem chipsets that facilitate the connection of devices
to wireless networks.267 The company holds many patents, including those extending beyond the technologies present in the physical
chipsets. Qualcomm bundled together all the patents it deemed necessary for its chipsets to function within a device, and then licensed
these patents through one licensing agreement on a “portfolio basis.”268 These patents consisted of cellular standard essential patents
(“SEPs”), non-cellular SEPs, and non-SEPs.269 Even during the negotiation stage, Qualcomm refused to provide customers with a list
of their patents or patent claim charts.270 Qualcomm also refused to
sell chipsets to those who did not sign a corresponding patent portfolio licensing agreement, namely the “no license, no chips” business model.271 This forced companies to expend money twice when
dealing with Qualcomm: once when licensing patents, and once
when buying the actual chips. Qualcomm also required customers
to cross-license their own patents, at zero royalties, as part of the
agreement.272
Qualcomm’s market power is partially derived from its own efforts and ingenuity. It is also in large part attributable to private
265

See discussion infra Section III.B.2.
Id. at 669.
267
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 665–66
(N.D. Cal. 2019).
268
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Id. at 672–74.
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standard-setting organizations such as the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions and the Telecommunications Industry
Association selecting Qualcomm’s technology as the standard to
which all devices, components, and networks must conform.273 In
order to be interoperable, all devices need to use the same Qualcomm-owned standard essential technologies.274
In May 2019, the District Court ruled against Qualcomm, deciding that it unlawfully secured a monopoly position in the chip supply
market through extensive anticompetitive conduct.275 The District
Court found that Qualcomm’s coercion and threats were effected
through different mechanisms, such as its “no license, no chips”
business model.276 It required customers to cross-license their patents in exchange for the rights to Qualcomm’s patents,277 refused to
license its SEPs to modem chip manufacturers despite its commitment to standard-setting organizations to do so on FRAND terms,278
entered into de facto exclusive chip supply agreements, 279 and
charged unreasonably high royalty rates for SEPs.280 The victims included many original equipment manufacturers and technology
companies, 281 with Apple, Intel, Samsung, LG Electronics, Sony,
Huawei, and many more affected by Qualcomm’s practices.282
The court held that Qualcomm’s conduct reduced competition
in the chipset market.283 This reduced competition likely forestalled
the advancement of technology, since the suppression of competitors and depression of their revenue led to reduced R&D spending
on the competitors’ end.284 Reduced competition also reduces the
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incentive of market dominant firms (in this case Qualcomm) to innovate and provide a better product. 285 A permanent injunction
against future anticompetitive actions by Qualcomm was granted.286
Qualcomm appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and applied for a stay of the execution of the injunctive order
pending appeal. In August 2019, the Ninth Circuit granted an order,
partially staying the District Court’s ruling that required Qualcomm
to license patents to rivals, terminate its practice of supplying chips
to customers on condition that they have signed a patent license, and
negotiate or renegotiate license terms with customers in that respect.287 In February 2020, the Ninth Circuit heard the substantive
appeal.288
2. USING PATENTS TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE
SEPs are foundational patents required for devices to be interoperable on the same standard or network.289 Standards are usually developed by industry members in concert by de facto wide usage or
through standard-setting organizations (“SSOs”).290 Certain patents
are essential for the compliance of the standard when market participants are incapable of designing around those patents or no alternative technology exists and is available. As a result, when an SSO
such as the Telecommunications Industry Association or Alliance
for Telecommunications Industry Solutions selects a standard, it

285
Richard Blundell et al., Market Share, Market Value and Innovation in a
Panel of British Manufacturing Firms, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 529, 550 (1999).
286
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 818-24 (N.D.
Cal. 2019).
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Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., 935 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 2019).
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Kristen Osenga, Anticompetitive or Hyper-Competitive? An Analysis of
the FTC v. Qualcomm Oral Argument, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/02/20/anticompetitive-hyper-competitiveanalysis-ftc-v-qualcomm-oral-argument/id=119124.
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See generally Standardized Technology and Standard Essential Patents,
FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftccompetition-concerns-markets-devices-smart/130103google-seps.pdf (last visited March 4, 2020).
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Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent
Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 237 (2014).
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usually requires the entity owning the SEPs pertaining to the standard to commit to licensing these patents on FRAND terms.291 Otherwise, the SSO will not adopt the standard. This practice ensures
that interoperability can occur as opposed to uni-operability due to
market monopoly and patent holdup.292 It also protects the public
interest in promoting competition, ensuring that potential competitors are able to compete and innovate.293 Without FRAND terms,
patent holders could monopolize the market by creating an essentially infinitely high barrier to entry. 294 On the other hand, the
FRAND commitment enables patent holders to obtain fair and reasonable compensations from licensing their SEPs.295
Some experts have argued that the FRAND terms should be
deemed a contractual obligation between technology companies like
Qualcomm and standard-setting organizations. 296 It then follows
that other technology companies cannot avail themselves of
FRAND terms to have SEPs licensed to them. Nor would they have

291
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2017
WL 2774406, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017) (holding that without FRAND terms
“a patent holder might be able to parlay the standardization of its technology into
a monopoly in standard-compliant products”) (citations omitted); Broadcom
Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Firms may become
locked in to a standard requiring the use of a competitor’s patented technology.
The patent holder’s IPRs, if unconstrained, may permit it to demand supracompetitive royalties. It is in such circumstances that measures such as FRAND commitments become important safeguards against monopoly power.”); Microsoft Corp.
v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015) (“To mitigate the risk that
a SEP holder will extract more than the fair value of its patented technology, many
SSOs require SEP holders to agree to license their patents on ‘reasonable and
nondiscriminatory’ or ‘RAND’ terms. Under these agreements, an SEP holder
cannot refuse a license to a manufacturer who commits to paying the RAND
rate.”).
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434–35 (2016).
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standing to sue the technology company in question for its violation
of FRAND terms.297
I argue against this proposition. Drawing on the Qualcomm ruling, I contend that courts should redefine FRAND terms as technology companies’ responsibility to prevent injustice created by technological development. Technology companies as patent holders
can derive huge benefits from standardization of technologies because such standardization creates huge patent licensing markets for
them. From this perspective, technology companies are bound to receive fair and reasonable return for their investments in developing
standard-essential technologies as long as these technologies are
adopted into industry-wide standards by SSOs. The elimination of
financial risk of sustaining losses for their patented technologies,
coupled with a common interest to share scientific advances and its
benefit across all consumers, justifies imposing an obligation on
technology companies to open up their SEPs on FRAND terms in
order to facilitate the diffusion of technology.
The Qualcomm ruling condemns actions taken by Qualcomm
that suppressed the ability of other technology companies to acquire
SEPs on FRAND terms.298 The court found that Qualcomm had an
antitrust duty as well as FRAND commitments to license its SEPs
to rival modem chip suppliers, but Qualcomm refused to do so because it could extract more lucrative royalty rates from dealing exclusively with original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”) and had
an anticompetitive intent to exclude competition. 299 Qualcomm’s
refusal to license SEPs to rival modem chip suppliers did not only
“promote[] rivals’ exit from the market, prevent[] rivals’ entry, and
delay[] or hamper[] the entry and success of other rivals”, but also
hampered competition by increasing the costs to OEMs because it
297
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was able to abuse its monopoly power to demand unreasonably high
royalty rates.300 End consumers were ultimately harmed by OEMs’
passing on of costs. By condemning these actions and holding Qualcomm liable for them, the ruling, therefore, imposes upon technology companies a responsibility to prevent injustice caused by licensing of standard essential patents without FRAND terms.
The Qualcomm ruling further reinforces FRAND terms as a responsibility to prevent injustice in patent licensing. It reveals that
obligating patent holders to license their SEPs on FRAND terms
alone is incapable of preventing injustice in patent licensing when
patent holders owning a dominant share of the market abuse their
monopoly power to get around FRAND commitments. They can
still engage in anticompetitive conduct, such as tying their SEPs to
the supply of chipsets under a “no license, no chips” business
model.301 By tying the two products (patents and chips) together,
patent holders are able to get around FRAND obligations by simply
charging a premium on the good or service tied to the SEPs. For
example, Qualcomm licenses its patents to a technology company at
a fair price but demands that the company also buys chips from them
and then charges 300% of the normal market price for the chips. On
paper, the technology company has managed to have the SEPs licensed to them on FRAND terms. But in reality, Qualcomm has
earned an exorbitant windfall by forcing that company to buy its
chips. Injustice in patent licensing in this case, therefore, arises because Qualcomm has precluded that company from buying much
less expensive chips.
C. Summary: The Fusion of Corporate Responsibilities and
Powers
The concept of corporate fundamental responsibility is not intended to substantially harm the interests of technology companies.
It does not erode any legal confinements of the Fifth Amendment
that guard private property by prohibiting “[taking] private property . . . for public use, without just compensation.”302 This is because the concept does not advocate deprivation of private property
300
301
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belonging to technology companies in any manner. Nor does it prevent them from reaping the benefits of their investments by selling
their products in the marketplace.
The concept of corporate fundamental responsibility is intended
to hold technology companies responsible for the market powers
they have gained. Companies are expected to pay due respect to users’ interests in their private data, reciprocating these users’ contributions in sharing information, and increasing their advertising revenues. Therefore, the costs of protecting private user data should be
understood as a means of fulfilling technology companies’ responsibility to reciprocate. The companies should bear those costs, treating them as a precondition to starting their technology businesses.
The same holds true for the costs that technology companies have to
bear in fulfilling their responsibilities to play their role positively
and confront injustices created by technological development. Since
the market powers of technology companies are only legally and
ethically legitimate if they act to fulfill these fundamental responsibilities, bearing such costs should be inherently embedded in their
business operations.
CONCLUSION
A recent study revealed that 42% of American adults credit the
biggest improvements in their lives to technology; a greater percentage than those citing the expansion of civil rights and the economy
in the past five decades.303 In this age of rapid technological development, however, the power gained by technology companies far
exceeds the responsibilities they have assumed. 304 Rather than interrogating the responsibilities of technology companies, however,
there has been greater focus on celebrating the astounding wealth
303
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Life Most in The Past 50 Years, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 12, 2017),
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the E.U. antitrust chief’s view that “companies such as Google should bear extra
responsibilities because they [were] so dominant that they [had] become ‘de facto
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they have amassed from stock markets and their users through the
exercise of their power.
In response, this Article has put forward the concept of corporate
fundamental responsibility as the ethical and legal foundation for
imposing three enhanced responsibilities upon technology companies: reciprocating users’ contributions, playing their role positively,
and confronting injustices created by technological development. I
have further considered how these responsibilities could be enacted
to improve protection of private data and to encourage technology
companies to exercise intellectual property rights responsibly.
Where technology permeates the fabric of society and individual
life, it is a lot easier for everyone, including technology company
leaders, to believe in technological determinism: a theory that elevates technology as a panacea for all social ills and individual problems.305 But the answer to the technology is not in the technology.
A single-minded reliance on technology’s power—without consideration of the responsibility that attaches to it—is not a path toward
a better future for all humankind. The concept of corporate fundamental responsibility, as this Article has proposed, shows that ethics
must come together with technology. This should be the mission of
technology company leaders who, in developing new technologies,
collecting data, and regulating speech, must act responsibly for the
future of humanity.
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